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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Questions of social inequality have been the subject of much
research in the social sciences. Geographers have recently entered
this field of analysis, adding an important dimension to the study
of inequality. Whereas other social sciences focus attention upon
discrimination by race, creed, color, sex or class, geographic
studies have emphasised spatial inequality. Marked inequalities
have been portrayed in the nations of the "developing" world and in the
"developed" Western market and mixed-economy welfare nations.
Within individual countries, specific regional policies have
multiplied as governments seek to overcome serious regional imbalances.
Concomitant with this has been the growth in the number of regional
economists, regional scientists and regional planners. Such has been the
development of these professional fields that a vast array of literature
has emerged, together with the establishment of teaching and research
institutes and the holding of international conferences.
In spite of its emergence as a part of governmental machinery
in a multitude of nations, regional planning has recently been subjected
to severe criticism. Much, but not all, of this criticism furnishes a
neo-Marxist perspective. From this standpoint, geographic inequality and
the inability of regional planning to rectify spatial imbalances within
1
2nations have been explained in terms of the flaws inherent in the
capitalist mode of production (e.g., Harvey, 1972; Holland, 1976). To
understand this criticism, and to provide a contextual setting for this
paper, a brief review of post-war planning theory is in order.
REGIONAL PLANNING: A BRIEF REVIEW
In the decade after World War II, regional planning was barely
accorded lip-service. Attention was focused instead upon policies for
the reconstruction of war-torn nations and the creation of rapid
economic growth. Economists were almost mute on the question of regional
development; in the words of Holland, "The 'where' of activity was
subsumed under the 'why' of price and profit theory" (Holland,1976:1).
Overall economic expansion emerged as the dominant concern in
both the theory and practice of regional development. It was widely
held that the achievement of high national levels of economic
development would, in turn, benefit regions which may lack the
resources - natural or human - to attain higher developmental levels.
Further, the allocation of national resources to the 'lagging' regions
was thought to detract from national economic performance.
Implicit in these notions of economic growth was a very definite
position on income distribution: inequality spurred economic motivation.
In short, equality was inefficient for growth (Friedmann & Weaver, 1979:
93) . Much emphasis was also placed upon optimal locations for industrial
development. Such locations would increase remuneration on all factors
of production, including labor which would flow toward the centers of
industrial expansion. In turn, increased demand from the prosperous
regions for goods from the stagnant periphery would induce a spread of
3development, thereby fostering regional equalization.
Some evidence has been offered of the gradual elimination of
inter-regional inequalities as national development proceeds. Williamson
(1965) undertook exhaustive empirical analysis of twenty-four nations,
concluding that regional inequalities are linked to levels of national
development. He suggests that divergence takes place as development
proceeds, but with higher levels of development diminution of these
disparities occurs. Several writers supported Williamson's hypothesis
(Friedmann,1972; Alonso,1968; Hirschman,1958), although a number of
authors question the validity of Williamson's findings on both method-
ological and theoretical grounds (Myrdal,1970; Kaldor,1970; Richardson,
1973)
.
Although the free-market may in theory provide a mechanism by
which regional development levels are gradually equalized, its abstract
form does not translate well into practice, particularly when a spatial
dimension is added.
The theoretical base for the free market in regional economics
lies in the general equilibrium theory. But general equilibrium
analysis tends to be static rather than dynamic. It rests on
marginalist assumptions, whereas in the space economy locational
inertia prevents instantaneous adjustments to marginal changes
in costs and revenues. Moreover, even if equilibrating tendencies
are strong the path of adjustment may be difficult and have
harmful consequences. The efficacy of market forces depends on
the assumption of perfect competition, yet ologopoly and
monopolistic elements are common in the space economy; distance
may be an effective barrier to competition (Richardson,1969;391-2).
The debate on the ability of market mechanisms to overcome
regional inequality was given new scope by two classic works which
emerged in the late 1950s. Albert Hirschman (1958) retained confidence
in the efficiency of market forces in the allocation of factors of
4production, believing that growth which originated in growth centers
would eventually trickle down in the process of searching for new
resources and markets.
In contrast to Hirschman's optimism Gunnar Myrdal (1957)
expressed concern at the possibility of deepening inter-regional
inequalities. He recognized both positive ('spread') and negative
('backwash') effects which would accrue from polarized development,
and advocated government intervention to counteract the natural
tendency of the capitalist system to promote regional inequality.
The concept of growth poles was dominant in the field of
regional development and planning for more than a decade. It evolved
rapidly under the attention of economists, regional scientists and
regional planners. Geographers also became engaged in the debate,
finding in growth center concepts, "a method of negotiating the
difficult transition from economic growth theory to the theory of
spatial organization" (Friedmann & Weaver, 1979:126).
By 1972, Leo Klaasen (1972:28) was able to suggest that "growth
pole policy has become an integral part of regional policy". Despite
its popularity and rapid evolution, the concept of growth poles was not
without its critics. In point of fact, little concrete evidence was
presented to display the positive effects of growth centers in the
diffusion of economic growth. Rather, there was mounting evidence to
the contrary. Particularly notable was Friedmann's (1972-3) observation
that political as well as economic conditions will tend to preserve the
dominance of the core over peripheral regions. Nevertheless, the
application of growth pole theory has continued.
5REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND CAPITALISM
The perpetuation of regional inequality in "developed" Western
nations and Third World nations has prompted renewed criticism of
regional planning theory. This has often been linked to "new" issues
in the debate on regional development. Human welfare and a concern
with equity, a new ecological ethic and advocacy of autonomy at many
levels of the territorial hierarchy have emerged as crucial issues.
Many such ethical questions had found a platform prior to the
Second World War. For example, there emerged in the United States a
group known as the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA) . Its
members initiated philosophical discussion of the nature and content of
regional planning. One central theme turned on the question of economic
development. The latter, it was propounded, was deficient as a goal in
itself. Rather, it should be allied to the all-round development of the
nation. This raised the question of equity over efficiency. Regional
planning was viewed as a means toward this end.
In America the term [regional planning] has also been used to
describe plans for city extension over wide metropolitan areas; this
type of planning should properly be called metropolitan planning.
Regional planning involves the development of cities and country-
sides, industries and natural resources, as part of a regional
whole (cited in Priedmann & Weaver, 1979:32).
Whilst not explicitly Marxist, these views had been prevalent in
Marx's analysis of the the imbalance and disproportion in capitalism.
Marx saw, in the subjugation of capitalism and the rise of socialism,
a means by which to overcome the extreme concentration of population in
large cities, the amelioration of differences between town and country-
side and the equalization of the levels of economic development of the
regions of the nation (Marx & Engels,1972)
.
Marxian analysis was swept aside by the neo-classical counter-
revolution which has dominated orthodox economic theory since the end of
the nineteenth century (Holland,1976:1), and the debate on regional
development of the 1920s and 1930s was lost with the outbreak of the
Second World War. But many of the principle issues have now re-emerged.
Particular attention has been focused upon the question of equitable
regional development.
For some, the underlying cause for spatial inequality lies in
the capitalist mode of production and many critics have adopted a
Marxist framework of analysis in order to discern the flaws inherent in
the capitalist system. Concluding a review of spatial planning theory,
David Smith resolved that,
spatial inequality in real income or well-being is inevitable
under a capitalist system. .. .Only in the mature socialist state can
we expect to see the spatial equivalent of: "From each according to
his ability, to each according to his needs". (1977:126-7)
PURPOSE OF TflE STUDY
Detailed analysis of regional development in socialist nations
has been sparse. As such, one is unable to judge the efficacy of
centrally-planned economies in overcoming spatial inequality . In the
light of continued criticism of the capitalist system this deficiency
needs to be addressed. It is the primary purpose of this paper to
review the theoretical foundations, and to assess the practice, of
regional development in a socialist state.
It must be amplified that many, if not all, of the Western
critics of the capitalist system would not be advocates of state
socialism as witnessed in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union.
In accord with Marxist-Leninist theory, the Polish authorities
have continually stressed the desire, and the advantages, of the
nation's socialist system to combat spatial inequality. Forty years
have now passed since the installation of socialist authority in
Poland and we may now conclude that sufficient time has elapsed for
these aspirations to be evaluated.
The socialist and capitalist systems share common goals. In
particular, both emphasize the primacy of economic development. As Marx
wrote of the future communist society, there will come a stage when
"the productive forces have also increased with the all-round
development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative
wealth flow more abundantly...." (Marx, 1950:22-3). This was echoed by
Lenin who wrote that the expropriation of the capitalists
will make it possible for the productive forces to develope
to a tremendous extent. And when we see how incredibly capitalism is
already retarding this development. . . .we are entitled to say with
the fullest confidence that the expropriation of the capitalists
will inevitably result in an enormous development of the productive
forces of human society (Lenin, 1968:333; emphasis in original).
Thus, Marxist-Leninist theory commits the nations of Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union to vast expansion of production and wealth.
It needs to be assessed whether Poland has, in the face of rapid
nationa.] economic growth, contrived to accomplish regional growth of a
form that would be compatible with their aspirations of spatial
equality. In other words, has equity received as much attention as
efficiency?
In Poland, regional planning is viewed as a means by which
national economic development can be coordinated in order to attain
8a more rational distribution of the population and socio-
economic activity, the evening-out of disproportions in living
conditions over the whole country, and the rational use and
conservation of the geographic environment (Halisz, 1976:24).
These aims have remained consistent since the hierarchical
structure of planning in operation in Poland today was established
by a government Decree in 1946 (Zawadzki, 1969:15). However, a prevailing
dilemma has emerged between the aims of regional plans and the targets
of national economic planning. The latter seek to maximize the
productive processes of the nation by means of the smallest possible
outlays, wastage or loss. As such the national economic plans seek the
most efficient utilization of national resources. In contrast, regional
plans propound an equitable distribution of productive forces and
redistribution of a nation's wealth. This may, particularly in the
short term, result in considerable conflict between nationally and
regionally planned goals.
Pragmatism has demanded an inevitable compromise between
efficiency and equity (Mihailovic,1975:26) . Chapters 3 and 4 will
address this compromise. The planning institutions of post-war Poland
will be discussed in Chapter 3. The position of regional planning in the
planning hierarchy has been subject to much flux and a consideration of
its relative status will provide insight into one facet of the
compromise between efficiency and equity in the course of the past
forty years.
Along with changes in the planning system, regional policy has
not remained consistent. In the elaboration of national economic plans,
emphasis has frequently oscillated between consideration of regional
development, to almost total disregard of this process. Spatial policies
9in post-war Poland will be discussed in Chapter 4. This will reveal the
apparent variation in the status of the "regional question".
Since important continuities exist between pre-war and post-war
planning theory in Poland, Chapter 2 will recount the emergence and
evolution of regional planning in Poland.
Having provided the contextual setting an analysis will be
undertaken of regional development in the past thirty-five years. This
will seek to uncover whether progress has been made toward the ultimate
goal of regional equalization in socio-economic development levels.
Chapter 2
EVOLUTION OF REGIONAL PIANNING IN POLAND
THE FOUNDING PF REGIONAL PLANNING OFFICES IN POLAND
Since the advent of the socialist government in Poland regional
planning has played a fundamental role in determining the spatial
structure of the nation. But the seeds of modern regional policy were
sown more than fifty years ago. In the decade prior to the outbreak of
the Second World War, there occurred important developments in the
methodology and philosophy of regional planning. A consideration of
these is indispensable when considering postwar regional policy.
The initial momentum toward regional plans was provided by
urban planners. There emerged a growing consensus in that profession
that the spatial extent of the city was too confined for adequate
regulation of its development. It was proposed that regional plans be
drawn up which took account of the socio-economic processes occuring in
the ininediately contiguous area and the surrounding region. The basis
for such plans was laid in February 1928 when a presidential decree
stated that whenever local (town) plans covered more than one gmina
(the smallest political unit) , "the local authority should appoint a
special conttdssion to construct the plan." (Zawadzki,1971:17).
The first such commission was established in October 1930 in
connection with the Warsaw city plan and bore the name of the Warsaw
10
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Regional Planning Office (Biuro Planu Regionalnego Warszawy) . This
agency published an important study in 1936 by Chmielewski and Syrkus
entitled Functional Warsaw fWarszawa Funkcionalnal which stressed the
need for the development of the capital city to take place outside of
the excessive concentration of functions in a limited area (Malisz,1966:
59)
.
The ideas and methods contained in the study were subsequently
adopted by contemporary planners for regional development schemes. The
concept of broad, functional regions in relation to city planning was
also adopted in New York (1929-31) , Greater London (1929-33) and Moscow
(1935) (Cherry,1980:8). A related initiative in Germany produced
Frankfurt's Transport Association for the Rhine-Main Economic Region
(Verkehrsverband fur den Rhein-Mainischen Wirtschaftsbezirk)
(Rebentisch,1980:85)
.
In Poland the broadened interpretation of city planning led to
the creation of other planning bodies in the cities of Lodz, Katowice
and Poznan. Gdynia, on the Baltic Coast, also had a planning body of
particular importance. The Versailles Treaty at the conclusion of the
First World War had granted Poland a small coastal area and to avoid
dependence on Gdansk, which had been excluded from the Polish
territories and given the status of a 'free city', the new town of
Gdynia was founded on the site of a former small fishing port.
The notion of planning regions was not confined to urban places.
Offices were also established in the extensive areas of rural over-
population in central and eastern Poland which required much new
industry to absorb excess labor, and in the Beskid Mountains in the
south which offered attractive recreational sites.
12
By 1937, eleven regional planning offices had been established
(Table 1)
.
The area embraced by each regional plan varied considerably,
ranging from the relatively small, but vitally important, Katowice
industrial mining complex, to the extensive Wolyn region. Together,
these plans combined to cover almost one half of the country's
territory.
Figure 1 illustrates the location of the planning regions. One
can observe the relative clustering of these regions in the central area
of the nation. This was primarily due to strategic considerations, which
were prevalent in the hostile atmosphere of the Central Europe in the
second half of the 1930s.
Much work was required to integrate the nation following
independence in 1919. In the eighteenth century Poland had been
partitioned between three powers: Prussia, Russia and Austria. The
levels of development between these three sectors exhibited great
variation (Leszczycki,1965)
. Intensive development had taken place along
the Odra and Warta rivers and in the ports of Gdansk and Szczecin in the
Prussian zone, together with the industrialization of Upper and Lower
Silesia. The development of the Russian sector centered upon the
district of Piotrkow, which included the Dabrowa Coal Basin and the city
of Lodz, wherein textiles were strongly developed. The cities of Warsaw,
Piotrkow and Tomaszow were also important centers. In contrast to these
areas the Austrian section witnessed little development.
These variations in development levels spurred the Polish
government to intervene in the economy. Of particular inport was the
desire to develop communication networks which extended across the
13
Table 1
Regional Planning Offices in Poland in 1937
Region Office
Location
Head Area Under
of Plan
Mfloe COOO km2 )
Warsaw Warsaw Jan Chmielewski 11.8
Lodz Lodz Kazimierz Gawronski 8.5
Bialystok Bialystok Waclaw Broda 19.5
Kielce-Radom Kielce Jozef Renski 12.0
Wolyn Luck Adam Jurewicz-
Jaroniec
35.8
Poznan Poznan Roman Pekalski 8.1
Gdynia Gdynia Kamil Lisowski 8.6
Krakow Krakow Zygmunt Novak 11.0
Lwow Lwow Jozef Rybicki 6.6
Stanislawow
Voivodship
(mountain region)
Stanislawow Stanislaw Niemierko 9.6
Industrial-
Mining Region
Katowice Stanislaw Piotrkowski 5.1
Total area 136.9
Source: Zawadzki, S.M. (1978) "Od Planowania Regionalnego do Planu
Krajowego", In B. Malisz (ed.) 40 Lat Planowania Struktury
Przestrennei Polski. KPZK PAN. Studia t.LXIV. Warsaw.
pp. 23-40.
14
FIGURE 1
PLANNING REGIONS IN POLAND, 1937
Poland boundaries in 1937
- Prejenl Polish bcundonet
Boundaries of other notioni in 1937
| Areos covered by regional ploni
Central Industrial District
SOURCE: QSTROWSKl 11966) I ROMA
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former boundaries of partitioning. Transportation was placed under the
authority of the government and development began with the construction
of a new railway from Poznan to Warsaw, via Konin (Winiarski, 1976:102).
This was part of a comprehensive plan for the reconstruction of
communications which was drawn up by the National Planning Office
(Figure 2)
.
THE SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF REGIONAL PLANS
The 1932 conference of the Association of Polish Town Planners
(Towarzystwo Urbanistow Polskich) established the scope of the initial
work of the regional planning offices, which was limited to the
collation and mapping of statistical material for each region. This
included the current conditions of the natural environment, demographic
data and private and public investments, along with some forecasting of
future population and economic trends. Further methodological research
was carried out at the Jagellonian University's Geographical Center in
Krakow. These initial studies led to the elaboration of an outline of
development for each region and thence to a third stage of constructing
an appropriate plan.
A number of factors contributed to impair the efficacy of these
regional planning bodies. First, although the studies undertaken by the
offices revealed serious socio-economic problems within the country, the
planning offices had no legal basis on which to base their policies. As
such the planners did not anticipate any implementation of their
policies, nor did they produce guidelines for their realization
(Zaremba,1966:274). Private ownership of land and property has also been
cited as a considerable obstacle to the resolution of planned goals.
16
FIGURE 2
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK PROPOSED BY
NATIONAL PLANNING OFFICE, 1937
TRANSIT ROUTES
INTERNAL COMMUNICATION ROUTES
REGIONAL NODES
SMC*' K. Pn.io.Mil. LFdiial koncipcjl tutinolaflicinjtJi * k
KoiMKI Btdgn I Prognoi PAH, Worm., 1974
podilaa urbofilitylil fiowttlHnt] In: Polt*« 1000,
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Stanislaw Piotrkowski, the head of the Katowice planning office, wrote:
A considerable majority of the land ownership lies in the hands
of large industrial concerns. ...with the result that each develop-
ment plan is subject to arduous co-ordination and negotiation, and
the desirable results can only be accomplished with considerable
goodwill on the part of numerous interested parties (1935:77).
The most frequently cited dilemma with regard to prewar regional
planning was the absence of a plan for the physical development of the
nation within which the regional proposals could be structured. Under a
special decree of the Minister of Internal Affairs in 1937, the regional
planning offices had been charged with the duty of establishing plans
which not only performed specific regional functions, but also linked
together to serve the national interest. But the absence of guiding
principles at the national level confounded attempts to co-ordinate
regional plans.
DEMANDS FOR A NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN
In due course there arose a clamor of calls for the establish-
ment of a national development plan by which the work of the regional
planning bodies could be co-ordinated. The advocates may be divided
into two broad groups: the urbanists and the scientists.
In September 1937 the First Congress of Polish Scientists
convened in Lwow under the slogan 'Mobilize Creative Energy for an
Independent Poland' (Zawadzki, 1971:32). The main issue of discussion
was the means by which Poland's resources - both natural and human -
could be put to their most productive use. Many of the proposals were
of a technical nature, relating to the development of transportation,
the electrification of the nation and the technology of individual
manufacturing processes.
18
In the first section of the Congress' report, however, the final
resolution called for the creation of a national economic plan as a
guiding force for regional plans. The former, it was proposed, could
attend to the division of the nation based on economic criteria, the
distribution of communications networks, energy and industry with
national and inter-regional significance, whilst regional plans could
devote attention to the delimitation of the economic functions of
individual regions.
Since it was realized that the proposed fundamental transform-
ations in production and the spatial structure of Poland could not be
swiftly attained, three time-spans were offered for national plans:
short-term (three years) , medium-term (nine to twelve years) and long-
term (fifteen to twenty years) . Although these proposals did not come
to fruition, the notion of varied time-spans for plans has been
important in the post-war period and provides an example of the contin-
uities between pre- and post-war planning practice.
In contrast to the scientists, many of the urbanists were
employed in the regional planning offices and, at first hand, had
recognized the need for the co-ordination of individual plans. Their
advocation of national planning was based on a desire for guiding
principles which could serve as a basis for methodology in regional
plans and the provision of legislation facilitating their realization
(Toeplitz, 1933:77).
In 1937 Chmielewski, the head of the Warsaw Planning Office,
suggested that "the regional planning process.... is approaching a time
when the planning of individual regions, outside of a national plan,
19
will become impossible" (cited in Zawadzki,1971:26) . He alluded to a
growing conviction among planning organizations that only the estab-
lishment of a central planning office, capable of issuing compulsory
directives and laws, could resolve the impending problems.
This appeal was echoed the following year by a resolution
adopted at the First Assembly of Regional Planning Chairmen (1 Zjazd
Przewodniczacych Komisji Regionalnych Planow Zabudowania) , which
stressed the need for directives upon which planning could be based. It
concluded:
the question of the organization of a national plan must be
treated as extremely important and urgent since the results of
regional planning depend upon its suitable and hasty resolution
(cited in Zawadzki, 1971:40).
NATIONAL INVESTMENT AND DEFENSE PLANS
The advocates of national planning were optimistic that such a
body would be formed, and their hopes were roused when an Office of
Planning was created under the authority of Vice-Premier Kwiatkowski in
connection with the Four-Year Investment Plan (1936-40) . The aims of the
plan were to stimulate the depressed national economy and to expand the
Polish defense potential. Both of these goals were closely related to
transformations of the nation's spatial structure.
The plan foresaw the exploitation of the potential in the under-
developed regions of the nation which were chiefly located to the east
of the Vistula River. In these voivodships employment outside of
agriculture was chiefly confined to handicrafts, small mineral plants,
timber and foodstuffs factories (Misztal & Kaczorowski, 1980:208) . This
area was designated as Poland 'B' in contrast to Poland 'A' which lay to
20
the west of the Vistula. A region known as the Central Industrial
District (Centralnego Okregu Przemyslowego) was also created (Figure 1)
.
This was deemed to offer a strategic location away from the Upper
Silesian Coalfield - at that time divided by the Polish/German frontier
- for new armaments and basic industries. This region was also an
integral part of a Six-Year Development Plan (1936-41) for the Polish
defenses. Within the Central Industrial District, it was forecast, new
investment would create approximately 107,000 new jobs outside of
agriculture, mainly in industry. The district was to consist of three
zones, each with a specialized function: Kielce voivodship (region 'A')
would supply raw materials; Lubelsk voivodship (region 'B') would be
developed for food supplies; manufacturing industries were to be
established in the district of Sandomierz (region 'C') (Winiarski,
1976:105).
There was an inherent connection between the Investment and
Defense Plans since it was the government's belief that linking the
problems of defense and the economy would provide solutions in each
sphere:
it appears [that such a linkage] will achieve advantageous
consequences for the nation, since a general economic plan will
serve defense, and the investments in the defense industries will
strengthen broad economic processes (Vice-Premier Kwiatkowski,
cited in Zawadzki,1971:44)
.
As was previously mentioned, the creation of a planning office
in connection with these plans fostered a sense of hope that the
succeeding stage would be a central planning body charged with the task
of elaborating a national plan. A considerable amount of research was
undertaken on the spatial structure of the national economy in relation
21
to the investment and defense plans. But the Planning Office never
employed more than a small group of specialists and had no formal
linkages with other spatial planning agencies (Zawadzki,1978:16)
.
Consequently the optimism appears unfounded.
THE LEGACY OF THE INTER-JHAR PERIOD
Both the investment and defense plans were interrupted by the
Nazi invasion in 1939. By that time a small number of factories had
been constructed in the Central Industrial District, employing some
10,000 persons (Winiarski, 1976:106). But for the most part the plans
failed to achieve significant results (Hamilton, 1982) . The considerable
disparity in development between Poland 'A' and 'B' had barely been
altered - although in fairness thirty years of post-war development
have also failed to rectify this. Nevertheless, there did emerge a
number of positive results from the inter-war period.
Perhaps the most significant of these was the contribution to
methodology in regional planning. The eleven regional planning offices
and the Jagellonian University in Krakow pioneered innovations in
regional analysis. Their work brought together an assortment of
specialists: geographers, naturalists, engineers of many types,
agriculturalists, economists, sociologists, architects and lawyers. The
result was a number of immensely detailed, diligent and fascinating
regional studies which facilitated a better understanding of the nation.
These works disclosed a multitude of unknown and valuable attributes of
the regions in addition to highlighting numerous social, economic and
technical problems which needed to be resolved.
Cartographic representation was broadly employed in these
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studies and it was another enduring impact which arose in the inter-war
years. It was subsequently employed to a considerable degree, along with
the other methodological advances, in the elaboration of post-war
regional plans. This was particularly evident in the work of Professor
Zajchowska and others in their research on the Recovered Territories at
the Western Institute in Poznan
.
The broadening of the urban canvas to include the surrounding
region, and the socio-economic processes pertaining therein, is a
further outcome of the prewar period. This found adherents not only in
postwar Poland, but also in other nations, and Chmielewski and Syrkus'
treatise on Functional Warsaw inspired a number of urban plans.
Besides the urban planners, Polish scientists and economists
began to produce tentative solutions to the questions of regional
disparities in levels of technico-economic development. Particular
attention was devoted to the means by which the underdeveloped regions
could break out of a vicious circle. Low levels of development
hindered the achievement of any fundamental changes in their structure.
In turn, the impossibility of the utilization of the resources in
these regions, particularly human resources, impeded their further
development (Zawadzki, 1978:18).
A further legacy emerges from a plan which was never introduced.
'The Recovered Territories was the name given to the area which
Poland gained in the West as a result of post-World War II boundary
changes. The Western Institute undertook exhaustive studies of these
Territories, publishing a series of regional monographs detailing
almost every aspect of the regions. The studies played an important
role in the creation of suitable policy for the area.
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In December 1938, Vice-Premier Kwiatkowski announced in the Polish
parliament a perspective plan for the development of the nation. He
suggested that it would extend over fifteen years (1939-1953) in five
periods each of three years. Each stage would stress the priority of
particular sections of the economy (Zawadzki,1963)
:
Stage 1 (to 1941) - construction of industry of military
importance
Stage 2 (1942-44) - communications
Stage 3 (1945-47) - modernization of the countryside and
agriculture
Stage 4 (1948-50) - urbanization and industrialization of the
nation
Stage 5 (1951-53) - standardization of development levels
within the nation, erasing the differences
between Poland 'A' and 'B'
The utilization of a long-term, perspective plan continued in
the post-war period. Elaboration of such a plan provides a framework
within which short and medium-term plans can operate. As such it is of
great importance in post-war planning practice, and its initial
conception may be traced to the 1930s.
Boleslaw Winiarski (1976:106) outlines four further legacies
of the inter-war period related to the conception of the Central
Industrial District:
i) the foundation of the Central Industrial District
represented a large venture attempting to change the spatial structure
of the nation and to initiate development in the hitherto weakly-
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developed regions,
ii) the creation of regional planning offices linked to central
government via the vice-premier,
iii) the necessity of government intervention in the economy was
explicitly recognized, and
iv) the notion of the Central Industrial District was founded
upon the establishment of modern industrial development. The application
of such industry in the transformation of the spatial structure of
economies considerably predates the theories of the 1950s and 1960s
which linked modern industrial development and growth pole concepts.
The 1930s was an important era in the development of regional
planning in Poland. Any consideration of postwar planning practice
demands examination of the continuities it furnished, since
one of the characteristic features of the system of planning
of the national economy as followed in Poland, is the use of
certain forms and instruments, historically derived from the
inter-war traditions, which serve the purpose of directing the
process of spatial development (Winiarski, 1966:57).
Chapter 3
PLANNING INSTITUTIONS IN POLAND
The problem of disproportionate spatial development and the
means by which it may be rectified have been important national issues
in most industrial societies since the Second World War. The British
have employed a number of measures in an attempt to promote
manufacturing expansion in the 'depressed' industrial regions (Lonsdale,
1977:590); the Italians have invested large sums of capital to attract
industry to the south (Holland, 1976:51); and the Scandanavian countries
have addressed the problems of inter-regional differences in living
conditions (Toft-Jensen, 1982:127).
The goal of spatial equality has ideological as well as
practical importance in socialist societies. In its pursuit of Marxist-
Leninist doctrine, the Polish government is committed to the eradication
of disproportions in levels of development among regions of the
country. This aim relates both to the economic structure of regions and
to a number of social and cultural indices. The elimination of inter-
regional inequality is viewed as the means by which the basis of
socialism will be constructed.
Economic development, and more particularly the development of
productive forces, is a crucial element in this goal (Malisz,1952) . The
propagation of industrial production is the main tool for creating a
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socialist society, and its introduction into every part of the country
is viewed as being "of vital economic, social and political importance"
(Dziewonski, 1962:45)
.
In tackling the manifold problems of regional development, the
Polish planners through central planning have at their disposal means
not available to their counterparts in the West. This enables vital
investment resources to be readily transferred between regions in the
pursuit of equalization. As such, "socio-economic rationality" can be
achieved in the national economy, in contrast to the supposed
"undirected and uncontrolled" process of economic development apparent
in capitalist nations (Winiarski,1966:97)
.
Despite these avowed advantages in the sphere of regional
planning, it needs be recognized that the command economy and
centralized planning were developed with the specific task of rapid
national economic growth in mind (Winiarski, 1972:191) . High growth
rates remain a fundamental goal for the Polish economy today. Thus,
Polish planners are faced with an apparently universal dilemma of
attempting to reconcile the desire for both high national and regional
economic growth.
PLANNING INSTITUTIONS
The legal bases and institutional form of physical planning in
post-war planning were first defined in a decree on April 2, 1946 which
resolved that
any activity, both public and private, pertaining to the
utilization of land and the settlement of population must conform
to the rules and decisions of physical planning (Economic Life
Cooperative, 1948: 31)
.
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Prior to this decree the Polish Cabinet had established
'sectional' plans which designated quotas for individual industries.
These now became part of the planned national economy. The
implementation of centralized policies was facilitated by the
Nationalization Act of January 1946. This transferred to state control
all formerly German-owned property, and all minerals, forests,
water resources, mines, factories and communications facilities,
banking and insurance, and a substantial proportion of the land
(Hamilton,1982:122).
Although a Three-Year Plan was elaborated for the period of
1947 to 1949, the five years following the conclusion of the Second
World War were dominated by an extreme liberality in economic planning.
Because of the enormous destruction suffered during the War this was a
period dominated by reconstruction. Decisions were often made
individually outstripping the pace of planning, and quickly, giving
priority to the rebuilding process (Kawalec, 1978:140). This was
particularly evident in the Northern and Western Territories. These
regions had been incorporated into the Polish state at the conclusion of
the War and the authorities sought to quickly integrate them into the
nation (Burns, 1981).
Despite the liberality of this period, in terms of planning
decisions, important advances were made in the creation of planning
institutions. Economic planning was placed under the direction of the
Central Planning Office (Centralny Orzad Planowania) . This agency
oversaw the coordination and elaboration of plans for divisions and
branches of the economy and also for ministries, industrial federations
and enterprises (Winiarski,1976:121) . Spatial planning was regulated
by the Central Physical Planning Office (Glowny Urzad Planowania
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Przestrzennego) , and consisted of a three-tiered, hierarchical
organization of agencies (Figure 3) . At the highest level stood the
spatial plan of national development. Local demands were incorporated
into this plan which, once resolved, became the guiding principles for
the spatial development of the nation. Below the central level of
spatial planning were two further tiers: regional and local (town)
planning offices.
Although Toeplitz (1978:23) has suggested that the tripartite
organization of spatial planning facilitated connections between
economic and spatial planning organs, other authors have contended
that the latter division of planning created considerable difficulties.
For example, Zawadzki (1969) suggests that spatial plans possessed an
'autonomous' character, remaining outside of economic planning. This
division was furthered by the differences in the principal elements of
each planning section (Winiarski,1976)
. Economic plans favored the
general utilization of economic decisions relating to production,
investment, employment and costs, seeking to maximize the economic
development of the nation. Spatial planning, by contrast, sought a
rational configuration of productive forces in accord with the
principles of regional equalization.
Centralization and Reorganization. 1950-55
Toward the conclusion of the Three Year Plan, critics of the
planning institutions questioned the effectiveness of spatial plans
which were being elaborated without concrete directives from economic
plans, and without adequate studies of the economic effects which might
support the proposed solutions (Zaremba, 1966:279) . In apparent response
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Figure 3
Spatial Planning Offices in Poland, 1947 to 1949
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to the criticism, the Central Planning Office and the Central Physical
Planning Office were liquidated. In their place there emerged a new
organization, the State Economic Planning Commission (Panstwowa Komisja
Planowania Gospodarczego)
.
Opinion as to the effectiveness of this new institution is
mixed. Winiarski (1976:123) suggests that regional planning was now
limited to simply issuing regulations of regional, or even local,
significance and that regional planners had little or no input into
plans for economic development. Specifically, the instruments shaping
regional development, the policies of investment location, remained in
the hands of the central organs. In contrast, Zawadzki (1969) maintains
that the singularity in planning administration furthered the
connections between economic and spatial planning authorities, thereby
enhancing the possibilities for spatial considerations to be advanced
during the initial stages of plan construction.
To some degree the debate is moot since the foundation for the
Six Year Plan (1950-55) had been laid by the previous, dualistic
system (Welpa, 1978:41) . In addition, the new plan contained policies
specifically aimed at the reduction of inter-regional inequalities.
The precise content of the plan will be discussed below; suffice it
here to say that the interests of individual regions were apparently
observed in the Plan, thereby making it unnecessary for strong regional
advocation. Draft plans were produced for fourteen key regions of the
nation and these areas were designated as future recipients of increased
investment in industry, transportation and housing construction. In
addition, initial studies were carried out for seven other regions
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(Zaremba,1966:280). Particular attention was focused upon the Krakow
region, the Upper Silesian Industrial District, the Czestochowa region
and the Lodz and Warsaw Industrial Districts (Zawadzki,1969)
.
In 1954 there arose a new office which assumed control over
regional planning: the Regional Planning Office (Biuro Planow
Regionalnych)
. Its history was short-lived asit was replaced in
1956 by the Voivodship Regional Planning Commission (Wojewodskim
Komisjom Planowania Regionalnego)
.
The end of the Six Year Plan marks something of a watershed in
Polish post-war history. It was a period of increasing social unrest,
culminating in street riots in Poznan and the return to power of
Wladyslaw Gomulka. Upon his reinstatement as First Secretary in
October 1956 - he had held the position from the conclusion of the war
until his imprisonment in 1949 - Gomulka promised decentralized
management and planning of the economy (MacShane, 1981:32) . His
proposals sparked an intense period of debate on questions of political,
social and economic life. Considerable reforms in all spheres of Polish
society were advocated. The object in the words of Po Prostu , the
student newspaper "was to bring about a radical transformation of the
Stalinist model of Socialism to a Polish model, genuinely Socialist."
But, in spite of the bountiful optimism, many reforms were not forth-
coming and, in many instances, centralized control was increased.
In the sphere of regional planning the debate on possible
reforms was carried out in important journals such as: Miasto .
Investycje i BudownictWQ, Gospodarka Planowa and Zycie Gospodarcze . The
participants in these discussions were unanimous on two questions;
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first, that spatial planning should be bound to a perspective, or long-
term, program of economic development and, secondly, that it should
retain its three-level character i.e. national, regional and local
(town) (Zawadzki,1969)
.
Some attempt was made at decentralization of investment
decisions. Laws passed in 1955 and 1957 reduced the central bureau-
cracy involved in investment. The State Economic Planning Commission
was limited to the control of enterprises employing more than 400
persons, whereas Voivodship Regional Planning Commissions were to
bargain with the central ministries for the location of smaller plants
(Kawalec,1978:156; Hamilton,1982:130)
.
Perspective Planning
The notion of perspective planning had emerged in the inter-war
years in Poland (see Chapter 2) and in the Soviet Union, Lenin's GOELRO
Plan initiated in the 1920s bore the characteristics of a perspective
plan (Kruszczynski,1974:37). Now, in apparent response to the petitions
of regional planners, perspective planning came to occupy an important
place in the Polish planning system. In 1958 the Voivodship Regional
Planning Commission produced a document outlining the development of
the nation between 1961 and 1980. In the course of the development of
this perspective plan, regional planning was regenerated in a new form.
Regional plans were now introduced into the economic planning of the
nation and interpreted as perspective economic development plans
(Winiarski, 1976: 123).
The aims of the perspective plans were outlined in the Spatial
Planning Act of 1961. This Act bound together the spatial and economic
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components of planning, thereby "making possible the total planning of
the development of various parts of the country" (Zaremba, 1966:286).
Perspective plans, however, do not possess a "directive" character,
that is, they do not contain binding decisions on future spatial and
economic development. Father, these plans outline the general directions
for such development and the presentation of firm directives remains in
the hands of the economic planners (Winiarski,1966; Kruszczynski,1974).
At the outset of the development of perspective planning in the
early 1960s, there were revealed considerable methodological problems
for regional planning. It was emphasized that regional planning should
become an integral component of perspective planning since this would
allow the analysis of the problems associated with the long-range
development of individual regions of the nation, their future functions
and their prospective role in the development of the national economy
(Zaremba, 1966:285). This was achieved through a union between regional
planning and perspective planning, since plans for long-term development
were now established for each voivodship.
But the new position of regional planning within the planning
structure was not without its critics. Much of the critical comment
centered upon the continued subordination of spatial planning to
economic planning. These two spheres were linked solely by the
Perspective Plan for national economic development and, as such,
Winiarski (1966) has suggested that there existed inadequate elaboration
of the potential problems relating to the process of the nation's
economic growth in spatial terms.
In spite of the contemporary, and continued, criticism of the
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planning hierarchy, no alterations have been forthcoming. Consequently,
the structure remains essentially the same today (Figure 4).
REGIONAL VERSUS NATIONAL PLANNING
In a discussion of future regional development in Poland,
Winiarski (1964:6) outlines the aims of socialism as
the satisfaction of each member of society through economic
development, not simply through the maximizing of national income,
but also through the appropriate division of income.... in order to
satisfy the needs of each individual.
On the principles of this statement, Winiarski continues, there
is no argument. However, a major concern is the question of harmonizing
the just distribution of income with the maximizing of the national
economy.
There are several ways in which national and regional goals of
efficiency and equity may come into conflict. Perhaps the most important
is the discord between planning authorities within the government.
It was previously noted that within the Polish planning
hierarchy, regional planning has become subordinate to national
planning. As such, the notion of equity has often been eclipsed by
criteria of efficiency. The question as to what degree regional policies
should be guided by egalitarianism in the development of individual
parts of the nation is one of the central problems shaping the
connections between national and regional plans.
The centralized economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union have stressed the sectorial structure of the economy and this has
often left the regions with a passive role in planning. Thus, it is
the ministries who are the brokers of regional development since it is
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they who possess and control the means for such development and, in
addition, they formulate directive plans regarding the distribution of
these means.
The strength of the branch-division system is furthered under
the principle of economic rationalization (Kruszczynski,1974) . Guided
by this principle, ministries seek to achieve the maximum effects with
minimum outlays. The result has often been one of increasing
concentration of production in established regions and centers. Such
agglomerative tendencies have prompted diverse reaction among Polish
authors. Winiarski (1966) suggests that a distinct advantage of the
socialist system is in its mechanism of redistribution whereby the
collective consumption fund can be distributed between regions without
regard to the amount of revenue produced in a particular region.
Other authors have questioned the continued trend toward
agglomeration. Lissowski (1965) called attention to the undermining
of local authority that would result from the ever-increasing
size of the economies of industrial branches and divisions. This
increase, he suggested, would require a concomitant growth of central
authority. There have also been calls for an augmentation of the input
which regional planning agencies provide in the national planning
process.
The increased scale and complexity of industrial development
prompted Kolodziejski (1972) to propose a complete overhaul of the
regional planning apparatus. He suggested that the existing apparatus
was ill-equipped to deal with the new technological and economic trends
of industrialization and urbanization. Contemporary industrial
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development, through the processes of concentration, specialization,
co-operation and integration, now functions at the macro-economic
scale. However, the regional planning structure continues to operate at
the more narrow, voivodship level. As such it is not capable of dealing
with contemporary processes of development.
To a considerable degree this deficiency has been rectified by
the increased importance placed upon perspective planning. This mode of
planning, since it does not possess a directive character, is able to
constantly re-evaluate its posture in the face of changing conditions
and advances in research (Kruszczynski,1974). This begs the question
as to whether its formulations are arrived at in advance of, or
succeeding important spatial changes.
Although the primacy of the economic planning apparatus is
subject to criticism, it must be noted that the critics do not propose
that regional planning replace economic planning as the principal
element in the national planning structure. As Zawadzki (1969) points
out, if that situation were to arise, rather than the Ministries
possessing considerable power, the large, wealthy regions would assume
that role. There would be fierce inter-regional competition for the
largest investment funds. Conversely, regions could discriminate against
industrial localizations if it were believed that there may arise a
clash of interests. For example, it may be considered prudent to prevent
excessive agglomeration or deglonmeration, to protect nature or the
landscape.
With regard to the former reservation, one may concur with
Zawadzki in the light of Khrushchev's "sovnarkhozy" experiment. In the
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face of a number of problems arising primarily from the strength of
the Soviet economic ministries, Khrushchev abolished the ministries in
the spring of 1957, transferring their administrative functions to 105
regional economic councils or "sovnarkhozy" (Nove, 1982:72). These
regional councils exercised authority over the economic ministries
during the course of the planned period. It was hoped that a regional
division of the economy would overcome the "empire-building" and
autarkic tendencies developed by the ministries. However, the region-
alization of the economy failed as the regional authorities essentially
replicated the failings of the ministerial structure. The sovnarkhozy
were accused of 'localistic' tendencies, or of putting local interests
before those of the nation (Pallot & Shaw, 1981:42). Amalgamation of the
sovnarkhozy, first to 103 and still later to 47, failed to overcome
these problems and the regional councils were abolished in 1965 and
the central ministries restored.
Consequently, it would appear that the most pragmatic approach
to achieving appropriate methods of regional development is to integrate
as fully as possible the branch-division and regional planning
institutions. By closely linking the two systems it should be possible
to establish an apparatus in which the feed-back relationships between
social, economic and spatial planning will yield an all-embracing
system of studying, anticipating and determining future developments
(Kolodziejski,1972)
.
CHAPTER 4
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION OF POLAND
Before considering post-war spatial policy it is necessary to
briefly describe the administrative division of Poland since these
divisions define the "targets' of spatial policy.
Since 1950 the voivodship has been accepted as the basic
economic and administrative region within Poland (Zaremba, 1966:287)
.
Prior to this time some regions had been given differential treatment.
For example, the Recovered Territories, comprising the voivodships of
Olsztyn, Koszalin, Szczecin, Zielona Gora, Wroclaw, Opole and parts of
the Gdansk and Katowice voivodships, had been treated as a large
economic region immediately following the Second World War. This was
done because destruction was considerable and, in addition, the Poles
sought to quickly integrate these Territories into the nation.
Industrial regions, such as the Upper Silesian Industrial District, have
also been the subject of plans at various times. Occasionally,
perspective plans are elaborated for areas which comprise parts of
neighboring voivodships.
From 1950 to 1975 an administrative division existed in Poland
comprising seventeen voivodships (Figure 5) . Reservations were initially
expressed that the new voivodships, incorporating older regional forms,
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FIGURE 5
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS, 1945-1975
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may not meet economic and social needs (Ministry of Reconstruction,1948:
48). However, the division imposed spatial limits on the development of
society and the economy and facilitated the creation of socio-economic
linkages within the voivodships (Czyz, 1981:6)
.
The seventeen voivodships remained until 1975 when an
administrative reform led to a completely new spatial pattern of
voivodships. The number was increased from 17 to 49 (Figure 6)
.
According to Malisz (1976) , the new voivodships are treated as "target
regional systems" which would seem to indicate that in the future the
voivodships are to become coherent and functional structural units. The
Perspective Plan for Spatial Development to 1990, discussed more
comprehensively below, proposes the creation of a spatial system based
upon "tempered polycentric concentration". In addition to twenty-three
urban agglommerations, twenty centers of "national importance" will be
developed. Consequently, almost all of the forty-nine voivodships are
slated for development as urbanized regions. Also, it is proposed that
economic specialization of the voivodships take place. The larger
number of voivodships, and their smaller size, is likely to facilitate
the foundation of homogenous spatial units, in turn permitting an
increase in their economic specialization.
In the course of work on regional plans, and in connection with
the Perspective Plan for Spatial Development to 1990 it became apparent
that an intermediate territorial division was required which linked the
national and regional components. This division would embrace inter-
voivodship connections since important economic and spatial linkages
fell between the existing territorial divisions. Thus, there arose the
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FIGURE 6
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS AFTER 1975
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macroregions (Figure 7) . It should be noted that the macroregions do not
have a plan preparation character. That is, no physical plans are
elaborated for these macroregions, although guidelines for macroregional
development are established. They do not constitute a separate
planning level, rather they belong to the central planning apparatus as
an integral component of the Perspective Plan. The principal task of
the macroregional structure is to coordinate and rationalize inter-
voivodship linkages (Pyszkowski & Zawadzki,1976).
The need for intervoivodship coordination and cooperation is
revealed especially in migration flows, foodstuffs, land-use,
raw materials exploitation and the conservation of the environment.
The basic issue is thus the formation by the [Perspective] plan,
within the boundaries of the macroregion, of a pattern of functional
linkages intended to make more effective use of resources, and to
increase the satisfaction of the needs of neighbouring voivodships
(Czyz, 1981:17).
POST-WAR SPATIAL POLICY IN POLAND
Throughout the post-war period the Polish authorities have
maintained a commitment to eliminating disproportions in the levels of
development among regions of the country. Policy statements have
continually cited the goal of 'all-round 1 development of the living
conditions in each region. This comprises social, cultural and economic
development. In the view of the Polish authorities, social and cultural
aims can only be attained through the appropriate economic development
of individual regions; industrialization is seen as the main tool for
creating a socialist society (Dziewonski, 1962:45). Consequently, this
review of policy will emphasize the economic policies which have been
introduced in the past forty years. Social and cultural issues will be
alluded to, but as in official Polish policy, they will be treated as a
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consequence of economic development.
In the past forty years one may distinquish four periods in
which divergent spatial policies have been adopted:
i) the late 1940s, Post-War Reconstruction,
ii) the 1950s, Centralization and Reform,
iii) the 1960s, Extension of the Resource Base and
iv) from the early 1970s to 1981, The Perspective Period.
Post-War Reconstruction
At the conclusion of the Second World War, Poland was
devastated. The relative losses of population (Poland's total population
shrank from 34.8 million in 1938, to 25 million in 1950) and property
(38.2 per cent of all fixed assets were destroyed) were unparalleled in
any other European nation (Hamilton,1982:122)
. In addition, Poland's
borders were shifted westward to the Odra and Nysa Rivers, whilst in the
East a substantial portion of land was ceded to the Soviet Union
(Figure 1).
The Territories gained in the West, following the Potsdam
agreements in 1945, had been part of the original Polish state in 966.
But a succession of foreign powers had subsequently occupied the
regions. The rapid integration of the Territories into the Polish nation
at the conclusion of World War II became a national priority since the
Poles were extremely sensitive to German criticism of the Potsdam
agreement. A separate Ministry for the Recovered Territories was
established with the express aim of rebuilding and integrating the
area.
The remainder of Poland also required extensive reconstruction.
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In several ways the Recovered Territories assisted in this design. The
Baltic coastline had been considerably extended, facilitating the
export of Poland's primary resource, coal. In addition, the Upper
Silesian coalfield was now a single unit within the Polish nation,
having previously been divided by the Polish/German frontier.
The Regained Territories fulfil three basic conditions for
industrial development: they bring in natural resources, a well
developed network of communication lines, and sources of power
built into a fine system of power plants (Economic Life Cooperative,
1948:18).
Given the need for extensive and rapid reconstruction, it is
perhaps not surprising that Kawalec (1978:140) characterizes the period
of 1945 to 1950 as one of extraordinary independence from the national
economic plan. Approximately seventy-five per cent of industrial
location decisions involved the question of whether to rebuild or
modernize destroyed structures (Kawalec, 1978:141).
Initially, sectional plans were introduced for each industrial
sector which stressed the need to rapidly restore industrial output. A
dividing line may be drawn between this period of sectional planning
and the introduction of the planned economy. The latter was announced
in a resolution of the National Home Council on September 21, 1946:
The National Economic Plan is the general plan for the Polish
economy, and comprises all the particular plans and the guiding
principles for all the branches and sectors of the national economy
(cited in Economic Life Cooperative, 1948: 30 )
.
The same resolution outlined the policy of industrial investment
for the Three Year Plan (1947-49)
:
Industrial investment should be undertaken according to the
promptness of its productive effect and the importance of these
investments to production, and in view of preserving the national
property from destruction (cited in Wrobel & Zawadzki, 1966:434).
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The emphasis placed upon reconstruction and the swift
development of productive forces is evident from this extract. It is
further manifested in the State Investment Plan for 1948 (Table 2)
.
Approximately 37 per cent of total investment funds were directed
toward the industrial sector.
Given the understandable desire to rebuild the devastated
national economy, ideological concern for spatial equality was
temporarily laid aside. Explicit statements regarding the location of
industry were made, but it is apparent that these took second place
to reconstruction. The National Home Council stated that one of the
factors determining investment decisions should be "the regional point
of view" and that "in the absence of a decisive factor of location,
further extension of industry in the region of Silesia should be
avoided" (Economic Life Cooperative, 1948:63). But during the course of
the Three Year Plan, nearly one half of all industrial investment funds
were directed toward Upper Silesia with the intention of securing the
maximum productive effects in the shortest time (Wrobel and Zawadzki,
1966:435). A further large proportion of investment was aimed at the
traditional, relatively well-developed regions of Walbrzych, Warsaw,
Lodz and Krakow (Zaremba, 1966:276).
Nevertheless, some important investments were undertaken which
were beneficial for subsequent regional development. For example, work
began on the creation of three new industrial regions in weakly-
industrialized areas: the Lomza region (Bialystok voivodship) , the Pila
region (Poznan voivodship) and in Sandomierz (Kielce voivodship)
Lijewski, 1978:56). The development of the last had begun in the inter-
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Table 2
State Investment Plan, 1948
Sector Investment
(milliard zlotys, 1948 prices)
Reconstruction and development
of state industry 69.8
Reconstruction and development
of local government, cooperative
and private industry and
handicrafts 3.8
Agriculture (excluding building
investments) 18.6
Sea fishing 0.7
Transportation (including
navigation and conmunications) . 45.3
Distribution of goods 4.0
Housing (excluding industrial
and transportation construction) 40.7
Health care 1.8
Social welfare 1.0
Public instruction and culture . 4.0
Total 189.7
Source: Economic Life Cooperative (1948) Polish Planned Economy,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw.
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war period as part of the creation of the Central Industrial District
(Winiarski,1976:105). As a result of such development, whilst the
greatest absolute increases in employment occurred in the traditional,
well-developed industrial regions of Katowice, Wroclaw and Lodz,
the highest relative increases were experienced in the hitherto weakly
developed regions of the North and West (Leszczycki,1965:32). For
example, the increase in industrial employment in the Koszalin
voivodship amounted to 171.5 per cent, compared to a national increase
of 144.4 per cent. But the absolute increase of 3,500 employees
represented only 1.1 per cent of the national increase in employment
(Chojnicki,1965:407)
.
Centralization and Reform
The introduction of the Six Year Plan (1950-55) was accompanied
by a period of stern Stalinist authority. The previous planning period
had been one of considerable latitude for private trade, handicrafts,
light industry and individual agriculture, and pronouncements had been
made on the protection of the private sector of the economy. But this
compromising attitude was subsequently abandoned. Boleslaw Bierut,
premier and Communist Party chairman, reflected the new posture:
[A people's democracy is not] a synthesis or a permanent
co-existence of two differing social systems but a system which
pushes out and gradually liquidates capitalistic elements and
simultaneously develops and strengthens the foundations of the
future socialist economy (cited in Starr, 1962: 86).
Many members of the previous government were imprisoned as
the Stalinist authorities strengthened their role in the administration
of the nation. An increased centralization of authority extended to the
sphere of regional planning where the State Economic Planning
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Commission now oversaw all modes of planning.
The concepts underlying the location of productive forces in
this period may also be attributed to this transition toward Stalinist
ideology. In the Act of Parliament introducing the Six Year Plan, it
was stated that
In the operation of the plan, a long-range process will be
initiated pointing toward a more uniform placement in the whole
country of both productive forces and social and cultural
facilities. The disparities in the economic and cultural
development of the country, resulting from Poland's economic
conditions in the era of capitalism, will be diminished (cited
in Wrobel & Zawadzki, 1966:435).
The notion of uniform placement of productive forces was drawn
from the work of influential Soviet economists. Now it became an
integral concept behind the distribution of productive forces in
Poland in the Six Year Plan. Malisz (1950) outlines the five guiding
principles for industrial location in this period:
i) the uniform distribution of industry,
ii) bringing industrial production closer to its resource base
and market places,
iii) activating under-developed regions,
iv) the deglommeration of industrial regions in which the
process of concentration has proceeded too far, and
v) increasing the nation's defense forces.
It is apparent that these principles contain a number of
conflicts. Through attempting to bring industrial production closer
to its resource base, it is highly probable that uniform placement of
productive forces will not be achieved since resources are far from
uniformly distributed. This may also, therefore, preclude the
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possibility of activating less-developed regions and achieving
deglonmeration.
Priority was given to heavy industry. This, too, drew upon
Stalin's philosophy of the need to provide socialist nations with a
substantial industrial base. The expansion of heavy industry was
intimately linked to the activation of the weakly industrialized
regions. The parliamentary Act introducing the Six Year Plan asserted
that in order to obtain basic economic objectives, the Plan aimed to
raise the economic and cultural activity of the backward
eastern and central parts of the country, and of several districts,
not yet economically recovered, in the western and northern
voivodships, by an adequate policy of locating productive forces
(cited in Wrobel & Zawadzki, 1966:435)
.
Overall investment in the plan was raised four times (from
6.5 billion to 26 billion zlotys, in 1971 prices) in comparison to the
Three Year Plan, of which seventy-three per cent was directed toward the
weakly industrialized voivodships (Lijewski, 1978:57) . Here there existed
considerable surpluses of manpower and these were seen as a beneficial
factor in the expansion of the industrial base. The plan projected the
construction of 1287 new industrial enterprises. These included the
initiation of several very large projects, for example, the shipyards in
Gdynia and Szczecin, a nitrogen plant in Kedzierzyn, a chemical plant in
Blachow Slask and synthetic fabrics factories in Gorzow Wielkopolski
and Jelenia Gora (Kawalec, 1978:93).
The extension of investment over too broad a front contributed
to a shortfall of 470 of the planned plants. Of these, almost half
(203) were destined for the least developed regions (Winiarski,1976:
97). In addition, Lijewski (1978:65) suggests that in spite of the
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initial intentions of the Six Year Plan, the majority of investment
was directed toward the industrialized and urbanized regions, notably
Krakow and Warsaw.
A supplemental reason for the relative failure of the plan to
be satisfactorily executed may be found in the international political
situation at this time. The intensification of the Korean War was
accompanied by large-scale armaments contributions from the member
nations of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) . It is not
possible to accurately determine the effect of increased armaments
production on the Polish economy. Edward Ochab, at the time First
Secretary of the Party, subsequently announced that Poland "spent
millions for the defense industry" and had "changes made in the Six
Year Plan" which were not revealed to the public (speech on Padio
Warsaw, August 16,1956; cited in Starr, 1962:133) . Consequently, it
would appear that the dislocation of the economy was substantial and
this contributed significantly to the failure in accomplishing planned
goals.
Whilst external events may have contributed to the shortcomings,
Pajestka (1972) asserts that during this period the priority given to
planning based upon branches of the economy and to short-term
considerations embodied in the Six Year Plan and its annual components
was not amenable to the requirements of rational spatial planning. This
suggests the existence of a basic conflict between efficiency and equity
criteria. Nevertheless, some progress was made toward overcoming
regional disparities in development, particularly in the Eastern
regions. In the words of Leszczycki (1965:33), the Six Year Plan yielded
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"the first distinctly noticeable diminution of the disparities in the
distribution of industries in Poland."
The period between 1955 and 1960 has been included in this
section because of the apparent continuities with the Six Year Plan
period. In political terms, however, these two periods manifest
considerable differences. The death of Stalin in 1953 and Khrushchev's
famous speech to the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party
in ftoscow in February, 1956, revealing the crimes of Stalin and
attacking his 'cult of personality 1 , opened the door for reform.
Wladyslaw Gomulka was 'rehabilitated' and assumed the position of First
Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party. Addressing the Eighth
Plenum of the Party, Gomulka reflected the mood of the nation:
There can be different types of socialism. It can be the
socialism that was created in the Soviet Union, or it can be formed
as we see it now in Yugoslavia, or it can be of some other type
still. Only by experience and by studying the achievements of the
different countries that are building socialism can the best model
arise in given circumstances (cited in Bethell, 1969: 219).
Some, but not all, of the demanded reforms were adopted. There
was certainly a liberalization in political and social life. Perhaps
the most important reform was the halting of the collectivization drive
in the Polish countryside. But in the sphere of economic planning, much
remained the same.
The new Five Year Plan (1956-60) was essentially a stop-gap
policy aimed at completing the overambitious tasks begun in the previous
planning period. Practically no new large industrial location was
undertaken in this period. Industrial investment in the first two years
of the Plan was held at similar levels to that of the previous Plan i.e.
approximately 31 billion zlotys annually. Only in 1958 was this
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increased and by 1960, it had risen to approximately 150 per cent of the
1957 total (Lijewski, 1978:156).
The second half of the 1950s was more important for the work
which was initiated toward the future spatial development of Poland.
In relation to this, one of the most important occurrences was the
creation of the Committee for National Spatial Development (Komitetu
Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania Kraju) . The Committee was established
through the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw and aimed at
the proper organization and coordination of spatial studies in
Poland, chiefly in the sphere of perspective national development
and the correct distribution of production and the settlement
network (Zawadzki,1969:97).
Policies for the development of the weakly industrialized
regions were now subject to analysis. It was now asserted that the aim
of these policies was not the assurance of uniformity in the
distribution of economic activity, but rather the optimal development
of each region based upon its conditions and resources (Winiarski,
1976:116). This shift in policy goals - from uniformity to
optimalization - represented a compromise between the objectives of
obtaining the maximum yield from investments and that of reducing
regional disparities in developmental levels (Wrobel & Zawadzki,1966:
438).
Accompanying this policy shift was a transfer of attention away
from location to economic regionalization and the distribution of
industry (Dziewonski, 1962:47) . For Opallo (1969) the relative emphasis
placed upon location or distribution reflects an inherent distinction
between socialist and capitalist nations. The latter, he claims,
stress the location of productive forces as it relates to economic
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laws and, more particularly, the economics of work, time and the
minimization of costs. As such, location first of all refers to
particular places, then centers. In contrast, the socialist economies
are more concerned with distribution since this relates to the
proportional size of regional economies. Through the optimal utilization
of economic resources in individual regions of the nation, the
distribution of economic activity may be suitably modified.
The form of the optimal distribution of economic activity was
laid out in the perspective plans which were initiated in the late
1950s. Through the elaboration of these plans it was hoped to achieve an
arrangement of the spatial economy that would ensure the maximum
effectiveness from the social point of view (Winiarski,1976). Thus the
plans addressed both the question of the need to liquidate the under-
development of certain regions and the improvement of the structure of
the economy in regions containing large agglommerations. The analysis
undertaken on the development of the economy was incorporated into the
perspective plans and also led to the guiding principles for the
subsequent Five Year Plan (1961-65).
Extension of the Resource Base
By 1960 the Polish economy had been rebuilt and attention was
now turned to the extension of the resource base. It was believed that
such an extension would further not only national economic development,
but also foster the development of weakly-industrialized regions.
At the Twelfth Plenum of the Party, the principles for
subsequent development of the Polish economy were outlined (Dziewonski,
1959)
.
It was stated that in undertaking new investment and the
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extension of existing industrial establishments, the following should
be observed:
i) the full utilization of natural resources occuring in
individual parts of the nation,
ii) limiting excessive migration and the localization of new
industrial establishments in order that surplus labor may be employed
locally, and
iii) the diminishing of the variations in development
between individual regions and the equalization of levels of settlement,
communications and services between regions.
Although specific mention of regional development warranted
only third place, it is immediately apparent that the realization of
the first two propositions could go some way to ameliorating the
spatial imbalance in development levels.
The desire to link industrial development to the exploitation
of natural resources is clearly restricted by the fact that such
resources are not uniformly distributed. In an attempt to broaden the
resource base, considerable emphasis was placed upon the detection and
development of new resource bases (Secomski,1959). For example, the
plan forecast the development of Tarnobrzeg based upon newly discovered
sulphur deposits, as well as Labaczow (gas), Zebca (sand), Leczycy (iron
ore) and Konin and Tarnow (both coal) (Dziewonski, 1959:28) . The
extension of the resource base was furthered by the construction of an
oil pipeline from the Soviet Union, via Poland, to the German Democratic
Republic. This enabled the introduction of a chemical complex in Plock,
a region otherwise devoid of resources (Winiarski, 1976:118).
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Rie reserves of labor in under-developed, largely agricultural
regions were treated as part of the resource base. This was
particularly important for regions which did not possess natural
resources. Manpower represented their potential for economic
development. It is also noteworthy that it was seriously questioned
whether it might not be better to adjust population levels to the
distribution of economic activities by means of migration (Dziewonski,
1962:47).
Simultaneously, the economic planners were considering the
economies of time and costs, and the dominance of these aspects impeded
the diffusion of economic development (Opallo,1969) . By 1962,
expansions of existing plant were absorbing 75 per cent of all
industrial investment and this necessitated the introduction of
measures aimed at ensuring the dispersion of industrial growth to
weakly developed regions. With some refinements the following measures,
introduced in 1962, were still in operation in 1980 (Hamilton, 1982:130;
emphasis in original)
:
(a) extending central control of all investments in new
capacity
,
both more important additions to existing plant and to all
plant on virgin sites;
(b) introducing studies of locational alternatives for
'footloose ' industries .... and
(c) requiring that studies outline the costs of alternatives.
More specifically, these measures led to the adoption of the
following policies: limiting the size of industry in the Katowice
voivodship and the provincial capitals of other voivodships;
developing further the Northern and Western voivodships; accelerating
the development of the overpopulated agricultural regions of the South-
East; and developing medium-size towns (Opallo, 1969:97).
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Several Polish authors have questioned the efficacy of the
initial measures and the policies derived from them. For example,
Gruchman (1967/8) suggested that in order to regulate excessive
concentration in production, these measures needed to be supplemented
by the introduction of differential incentives with regard to
transportation tariffs, the charges and costs for land-use in towns and
the costs of communal services and maintenance costs in industrial
centers. Strong incentives, Gruchman (1967) proposed, would facilitate
the regulation of industrial development in the desired direction.
Although the proposals of Gruchman and others went unheeded,
the second Five Year Plan (1966-70) prescribed deglommeration of the
largest industrial centers. But it conspicuously failed to amplify the
means by which this was to be achieved. No specific policies were
outlined for the creation of the infrastructure in weakly developed
regions which was imperative for decentralization to proceed. In
particular, there arose an internal conflict in the plan between its
spatial conceptions and the branch-division means of investment
(Winiarski, 1976: 120). The latter favored continued agglommeration
because of the perceived advantages in the economies of production in
large-scale industrial complexes, spatial cooperation, internal
economies and so forth (Lissowski,1965). Industrial investment may be
considered as a marginal increment in relation to the total fixed assets
present in an industrial center. As such, the larger the center, the
more marginal capital investment in industry will be. This notion
further encouraged agglommerative tendencies.
There was, certainly, some deconcentration. Immigration
59
restriction and some deglommeration of industry facilitated this.
In many cases, however, the movement of industry took place only from
the inner city areas to the peripheral districts where extensive
housing development was occuring along with the creation of suburban
shopping centers (Jerczynski,1977) . Winiarski (1976:120) concluded
that the overall result of deglommeration policies was not a
reduction in the strains between the productive and infrastructural
spheres, rather these strains showed a marked tendency to increase.
The Perspective Period
Toward the conclusion of the 1960s serious deficiencies in the
Polish economy became apparent. In particular, the emphasis placed upon
heavy industry, no matter the cost, had led to a neglect of consumer
goods, housing and services (Lijewski, 1978:165) . An explosive situation
arose from consumer dissatisfaction and the reaction against the
repression which accompanied demands for greater intellectual freedom
in 1968. The spark was provided by Gomulka's decision to raise meat
prices by 30 per cent in 1970. The resultant strikes and army action -
officially the death toll was 45 - brought down Gomulka. On December
19th, 1970 he was replaced as First Secretary by Edward Gierek.
The arrival of Gierek was accompanied by an acceleration of the
economic development of Poland. Intensive investment in industry,
particularly the heavy sector, was continued; on average, industrial
investment grew by 22 per cent annually. By 1975, annual industrial
investment stood at 239 billion zlotys, a rise of 169 per cent over
1970 (Lijewski, 1978:167) . Some attempt was also made to expand the
consumer industries, but there remained considerable shortages. The
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perception of consumer shortages was exacerbated by the wage
increases which had been granted in 1970. Personal income now far
outstripped market supplies (Ascherson,1981:164)
.
The expansion of the Polish economy which was undertaken by
Gierek was primarily financed by Western creditors. With the development
of detente policies Poland was able to obtain massive loans. Table 3
illustrates the growth of the Polish hard currency debt to the West
in the course of the 1970s. By 1979, Poland owed $21 billion to the
West. In addition, Poland had obtained credits from the Soviet Union
and had participated in the construction of industrial plant abroad
(Lijewski,1978:180) . The massive injection of foreign capital
resulted in a considerable expansion of the Polish industrial capacity;
more than half of Poland's capital has been formed since 1970 (Macshane,
1981:38).
Concomitant with the policies of industrial expansion was the
stress placed upon the need for large-scale, efficient plants in or
near major urban centers (Hamilton, 1982:131). Spatial policies sought
an appropriate balance between dispersion and concentration, between
containment of the largest urban-industrial centers and the application
of growth pole concepts of a moderate form.
These new policies were embodied in the Perspective Plan for
Spatial Development to 1990. This plan foresees the future spatial
configuration of Poland as one of "tempered, polycentric concentration"
(Jagielski, 1973: 652). By this means it is hoped that a holistic
approach to economic, social and spatial factors may be forged in
order to obtain the most advantageous results in all spheres (Secomski,
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Table 3
Polish Gross Hard Currency Debt to the West,
1971-1979 (million OS dollars)
1971 1,138
1972 1,564
1973 2,796
1974 4,643
1975 8,014
1976 11,483
1977 13,967
1978 17,844
1979 21,000
Source: Estimating Soviet and East European Hard Currency Debt .
Washington, National Foreign Assessment Center, June 1980.
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1980:13).
The plan proposes the creation of 23 agglomerations and 20
large urban centers of "national importance" (Kawalec, 1978:146) . The
following strategic goals are also outlined: the acceleration of
development in the Northern and Eastern regions, strengthening the
position of the central regions, particularly the Warsaw agglommeration
and the complex reconstruction and modernization of the Southern
agglommerations through the development of modern growth factors
(Pinkowski, 1974:494).
Each voivodship is now to be treated as a "coherent, functional
unit" based upon specialized functions. In order to facilitate the
achievement of regional specialization an administrative reform was
undertaken in 1975, increasing the number of voivodships from 17 to 49
and replacing the previous three-tier system (voivodship, powiat,
gmina) with a two-tier system (voivodship, gmina) (Czyz, 1981:6) . The
reduction in size of the voivodships is believed to promote the creation
of homogenous spatial units.
The structure of each voivodship will be based upon an urban
center, with its surrounding region forming a structural unit. Outside
of the central urban zone will be a zone which is to be only partially
urbanized. Beyond this an 'external' zone will serve as a 'shield' or
spatial reserve for subsequent urbanization that may arise from future
development (Berezowski,1974:46)
. In addition, 'strip' or 'corridor'
development will link the agglommerations (Grabowiecki, 1973:114).
Figure 8 illustrates the proposed settlement distribution and the
linkages between each urban node. The large interstitial areas are to
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FIGURE 8
POLAND-- PROPOSED SETTLEMENT NETWORK
URBAN AGGLOMMERATIONS
CENTERS OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE
LINKAGES FOR TECHNICO"ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE
RECREATIONAL AREAS
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be protected for farming, forestry, tourism and water supply (Hamilton,
1982:131).
Optimistic Polish authors claimed that the adoption of the
Perspective Plan will result in the "quick and very rational
development of both individual regions and the whole nation" (Jagielski,
1973:649), and that the realization of planned aims will succeed in
reducing regional disparities in development by one half (Zawadzki,
1974:566). However, Hamilton (1982) points out that decisions taken
prior to the adoption of the Perspective Plan, in the early 1970s,
will serve to accentuate the growth of Southern Poland (with the
establishment of Huta Katowice and the Bielsko and Tychy auto plants)
and near Warsaw (through the Ursus tractor plant and the Polski Fiat
car plant)
.
Events in the past five years serve as a reminder that the
authority's path to the achievement of its planned goals is extremely
precarious. In particular, the burden of an enormous foreign debt
threatens to overshadow the alleviation of regional disparities.
Nevertheless, some of the most intense industrial action in 1980-81 was
witnessed in regions such as Bielsko, Plock, Jelenia Gora and Bydgoszcz,
regions in which industrial development has been slight and the communal
infrastructure remains poorly developed. It remains to be seen whether
the authorities can reconcile a dire need for national economic
efficiency with an exigency to overcome spatial inequality.
SUMMARY
Before proceeding to an analysis of regional development in
post-war Poland it is useful to provide an overview of the discussion on
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planning institutions and spatial policy.
It was noted that the position of regional planning in the
Polish planning hierarchy has been subject to ituch flux. Tliis would
appear to reflect attempts to seek an appropriate solution to the
conflicts that exist between the goals of national and regional
planning. Ministerial domination of the planning process has been
prevalent and, as such, regional considerations have often been
subordinated to national priorities. While Polish authors have advocated
an increase in the regional input in the planning process, the
experience of Khrushchev's sovnarkhozy experiment prevents these same
authors from recommending regional dominance of the planning hierarchy.
Perspective planning is recognized as a means by which these
conflicts may be reconciled. Through the elaboration of long-range
goals for the economy and the spatial configuration of the nation, it
is hoped that an appropriate balance may be struck. This has given rise
to the Perspective Plan for Spatial Development to 1990. As the latest
element in post-war spatial policy, this plan proposes development
based upon "tempered, polycentric concentration" in order to achieve
the quick and rational development of individual regions and the nation.
Prior to the emergence of perspective planning, spatial policy
had been inconsistent. Hnphasis had shifted from the uniform placement
of productive forces to optimalization of the national economy. Once
again this would appear to represent an attempt to strike an
appropriate compromise between national and regional policy goals. In
light of these rather abrupt changes in policy it needs to be assessed
whether the Polish authorities have succeeded in reducing regional
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disparities in socio-economic development. The following chapter will
undertake an analysis of regional development in order to ascertain
whether convergence has taken place, or whether adjustments in policy
have compromised the aim of the eventual elimination of regional
disparity.
CHAPTER 5
AN ANALYSIS OF SPATIAL EQUITY IN POLAND
It is the primary purpose of this chapter to undertake an
analysis of regional development levels in Poland in order to ascertain
whether the oft-stated goal of equality in economic, social and cultural
spheres of life has been achieved. Before embarking upon this analysis,
however, it is necessary to consider the notion of equity.
As an integral part of policy throughout Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union, the concept of equity is derived from the work of Marx
and Engels. In their Manifesto of the Communist Party (1972:58) it was
stated that the advent of socialist authority would enable "a gradual
abolition of the distinction between town and country". This was
interpreted by socialist authorities as an advocation of the pursuit of
equal living standards for each and every member of society. As such it
formed a cornerstone of laws instituted by Lenin and the Soviet
Conmunist Party which are now common to locational decision-making in
all planned economies (Hamilton, 1970:85)
.
Nonetheless, whereas "equality is the easiest criterion to
apply to the evaluation of distributions...,the criterion of equality is
not as easy to apply as might appear at first sight" (Smith,1977:132)
This difficulty derives principally from the fact that the achievement
of equality in results may require inequality in resource allocation.
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This is further compounded by the historical aspect of regional
development which may demand vast differences in expenditure in order to
attain equable development levels.
Official pronouncements in Poland (as outlined in Chapter 4)
would appear to suggest that the government is prepared to undertake
differential investment in order to attain the equalization of living
standards throughout the nation. But, as Winiarski (1972:194) points
out, whilst the principle of assuring an equal chance for participation
in national income for individuals in all regions of the nation is
indisputable, considerable problems arise when a nation attempts to
realize this principle. A particular dilemma relates to the achievement
of equality without detracting from the efficient functioning and
growth of the national economy. As a result, pragmatism has demanded an
inevitable compromise between efficiency and equity (Mihailovic,1975:
26).
By virtue of the centralized decision-making in the economy,
socialist societies possess greater freedom to disperse both investment
and consumption funds in the pursuit of regional equality. But, as Smith
(1977:138) suggests
Even under socialism, inequality is to be expected as long as
labor is compensated by wages; as in a capitalist system, this may
compound other personal advantages.
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the socialist system
overcomes the effective control of a relatively small elite and,
thereby, provides a means by which more equable living standards may be
obtained. This relates in particular to the sphere of social and
cultural equality, with the result that the single process of regional
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development has frequently been split into socio-cultural and economic
processes (Mihailovic, 1975:28) . In light of this, one may expect to
witness a gradual diminution of regional disparities in socio-cultural
levels as the result of national economic development.
THE MEASUREMENT OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Concomitant with the growth of interest in social equality has
been the proliferation of techniques for assessing regional development.
These have adopted varying degrees of complexity in the pursuit of an
adequate method. As a relative fledgling in the scientific community,
no consensus has been reached as to the most appropriate indicator or
indices of regional development. In addition, relatively little research
has been undertaken on regional inequality in socialist countries (with
the possible exception of the Soviet Union)
.
Perhaps the first, and certainly one of the most comprehensive,
studies of regional development was undertaken by Jeffrey Williamson
(1965). His empirical study of twenty-four nations is regarded as a
classic. Employing a coefficient of variation, Williamson concluded
that the divergence or convergence of regional inequalities are a
function of national development. However, Williamson's work fails to
identify the trend within particular regions. As such, Zimon (1978)
concludes that Williamson's primary contribution to the field of
regional development studies is derived from the stimulus he provided
in that sphere.
A plethora of techniques have subsequently emerged. Single-
variable measures employing, for example, regional income have been
criticized as not being sufficiently comprehensive. Quite obviously
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regional development is derived from a number of sources each of which
requires measurement. But attempts to produce multiple-variate
techniques have often suffered from a neglect of important economic
indicators (Knox, 1975)
.
Anyone who has undertaken research in the social sciences is
probably aware of the numerous pitfalls which may await the researcher.
This is particularly true of attempts to undertake temporal analysis
extending over any length of time. The reporting of statistics
frequently fluctuates and categories may even disappear. These problems
are manifolded in research upon Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
For Poland there is a relative abundance of statistics
available for the post-war period. Besides the customary Statistical
Yearbook (Rocznik Statystyczny) , the Central Statistical Office
publishes a diverse collection of statistics. Be that as it may, when
undertaking a protracted study one is often confronted with the
frustration of incomplete series. This is particularly the case for
regionally disaggregated statistics.
Fallenbuchl (1975:16) suggests that the most useful indicator
of relative levels of development for Poland would be per capita
national income produced within each region. Unfortunately, these
statistics are available for only a few years. In addition, the
measurement of national income in socialist nations employs the
"production method"; that is, it includes only the net value added in
material production branches and excludes the net value added in the
service and government sectors (Koropeckyj,1972)
. As such these
statistics may overlook considerable interregional differences in these
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sectors, producing a considerable downward bias in the economic
development levels of urbanized regions where the tertiary sector is
particularly well-developed.
As a result of the apparent vagaries of Polish statistics,
studies involving temporal series have been few (e.g. Brown & Trott,
1968;Fallenbuchl,1975). In contrast there have been a number of "static"
inquiries which consider regional differentiation at a particular
moment in time (e.g. Hamilton, 1982).
Quite apart from these considerations regarding data
availability, the administrative reforms undertaken in 1975 confound
attempts to produce temporal studies of regional development. Some
statistics have been converted to approximate the new administrative
boundaries, but these are few. Consequently, it is most useful to
employ cartographic representation of development levels when assessing
spatial variation since this permits the researcher to identify patterns
in development levels.
MEmcpQLQGY
It is the aim of this analysis to consider regional development
levels in Poland between 1955 and 1981 in order to assess whether these
levels display convergence or divergence. Against the background of the
oft-stated goal of regional equity one may expect to witness the former.
However, it was described in the previous chapter how policy has often
been subverted by subsequent action. In this light it is necessary to
consider regional development levels over a period of tine so as to
ascertain the results of successive policies on relative development
levels.
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In accordance with Marxist-Leninist theory the Polish
authorities continually stress the desire to achieve "all-round"
development of the Polish voivodships. In view of this it was considered
most appropriate to adopt a method of analysis which would indicate
overall levels of development of the voivodships. Individual indicators,
for example industrial production, may display considerable increases
over time, but this may obscure relative neglect of the social
infrastructure. Conversely, it needs to be assessed whether a relative
deficiency in economic development is associated with continued social
disadvantage, or whether the socialist system has provided a means by
which the benefits of national economic growth may be conferred upon
regions which lag in terms of economic development.
From the data available, a number of variables have been
selected in order to provide some insight into the relative disparities
among the Polish voivodships. The variables, discussed below, combine
both social and economic indicators. Their selection was intended to
provide a comprehensive index that might reveal social and/or economic
inequity. Considered over time this index may unveil whether the Polish
authorities have succeeded in their aim of reducing, and ultimately
eliminating, regional disparities.
Although some constraints were encountered in the selection of
variables because of data availability, the variables arrived at do, I
feel, provide an adequate index for regional development. A brief
description of the variables, and the reasons for their adoption,
follows.
The variables of employment, investment and industrial
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production in socialized industry are obviously economic in nature.
They were selected in order to divulge the relative levels of economic
development among the voivodships. In Chapter 4 the primacy accorded to
economic development in Polish regional and national policy was
discussed. As such one would expect to observe relative increases in
these indices among the least developed regions if any headway were to
be made toward eliminating regional inequity.
For the consideration of social development the following
indicators were selected: residential space, retail sales, kindergarten
enrollment, students in higher education, radio and television
ownership, number of doctors and number of hospital beds. It was felt
that this combination of variables would provide good insight into
relative levels of social development.
Residential space was felt to provide an important guide to the
relative development of the social infrastructure. Since the immediate
post-war period of reconstruction the Polish authorities have deemed
it fundamental to provide adequate housing for each member of society.
Although the norm of minimum personal housing space has been
successively revised downward, this remains a fundamental goal. Early
policy statements, which reflect subsequent stances, outline the need to
develop housing as a prelude to economic development.
When a new region is to be established around a new centre,
the development of that centre is prerequisite. The direct
consequence of this is the need of two plans for regional division:
the first, based upon existing urban centres, is called the possible
(short-term) ; the second, based on existing and proposed urban
centres, is the postulated (long-term) plan.
The transition from the possible to the postulated plan
depends on appropriate building policies (Ministry of
Reconstruction, 1948:73; emphasis in original)
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It is apparent that the extension of economic development
throughout the nation is seen as demanding adequate expansion of the
housing stock. The index of residential space will provide an indicator
of this.
In the course of the past forty years, the industrialization of
Poland has taken an extensive character. This involves the absorption
of quantitative factors of growth by means of setting in motion the
increased exploitation of natural resources and an increase in
employment through the creation of new work-places in previously
weakly-developed regions (Winiarski, 1976: 273 ) . The introduction of
women into the labor force has been an integral part of this policy.
This fact lay behind the selection of kindergarten enrollment as an
indicator of development. The provision of pre-school facilities
releases women from domestic responsibilities in order that they may
partake in industrial expansion. Kindergartens are, thus, an
important component of the social infrastructure which may, in turn,
exert a considerable influence upon economic development.
Both retail sales and radio and television ownership were
selected for their utility in indicating relative consumption levels
among voivodships. They may be considered as indicators of living
standards and may reveal whether redistribution of income has been
undertaken to a suitable degree. Intimately linked to living standards
is the notion of health and welfare. In order to discern spatial
variation in welfare provision, the indexes of doctors and hospital beds
were chosen.
The higher education index may be considered as a further
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component of living standards. Advanced education is almost
universally accepted as desirable in itself, and so the possession
of a large student body may be thought to indicate development. But,
perhaps more importantly, this variable includes not only universities,
but also technical and agricultural training schools. Many such schools
draw upon the local population and are therefore likely to benefit
their region of location. Personal experience has also suggested that
graduate student research may be incorporated into local policy
decisions and, as such, further benefits may accrue.
In addition to these variables a further indicator, urban
population, was adopted. This variable assumes both an economic and
a social character. In terms of the latter, urban residence can provide
improved access to housing and relatively scarce goods and services. A
high degree of urbanization is also associated with economic
development since the urban areas possess the infrastructure necessary
for economic advancement.
It has already been noted that the collation of data pertaining
to the regional divisions of Poland is fraught with difficulties. As a
result of limited data availability the process of variable selection
was curtailed. It is certainly recognized that the eleven variables may
not represent the most appropriate indicators of regional development.
Each may be subject to influences extraneous to the regional development
process. For example, a lack of kindergarten enrollment may arise from
the persistence of traditional family care rather than neglect of a
region's social infrastructure. And radio and television ownership may
be more reflective of availability than explicit government policy
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aimed at redressing imbalances in regional living standards.
While I recognize these shortcomings in the variables employed
it is necessary to emphasise the lack of alternative indicators. As
such one must be prepared to accept the eleven variables as the best
possible measures.
In each case the original data have been transformed into
per capita scores through division by the population of the region. This
provides more comparable observations for regional development levels
since it eliminates the source of possible disproportions arising from
large, or small, regional populations. In the study of regional
disparities it is more suitable to compare such ratio data because it
is the relative "rate" that one is seeking to observe rather than the
absolute value.
The primary method employed for the analysis of this data is the
computation of z-scores or standard scores. These scores transform the
original data such that its mean becomes zero and its standard deviation
unity. The z-score is thus:
n
_ Ai £>
where Z. is the standardized score for the ith observation,
Xi is the original score,
X is the mean for all values of Xi
and S is the standard deviation of X.
Thus the original data are expressed in terms of their dispersal
(positive or negative) around the mean. This has instant advantages
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since the signs are such that for each variable, positive is "good" and
negative "bad" (Smith, 1975: 159 )
.
In addition to providing a measurement of the relative level of
incidence of a particular variable, a composite score may be obtained
by summing the standard scores for each region. Once again the signs
may connote "good" or "bad". There are, as with any model, conceptual
limits in the production of a 'Standard Score Additive Model':
It requires a gross assumption to define the function which
determines the level of social well-being as the summation of
standard scores on a set of variables. But in the absence of
superior knowledge, the additive model at least provides a starting
point for geographical description (Smith, 1973:86).
Happing of the composite scores further enhances their utility
as indicators of spatial variation in development levels.
INTERPRETRTION OF DATA
The z-scores for the selected variables are presented in Tables
4 to 9. In addition to the scores for individual variables, combined
scores are presented for the economic variables (employment, investment
and industrial production) , for the social variables (the remainder)
and for the combined economic and social variables.
Between 1955 and 1970 the regions obtaining the highest and
lowest composite scores remained broadly similar. Katowice, Gdansk and
Warsaw exhibited extremely high positive scores, whilst Bialystok,
Kielce, Lublin and Rzeszow registered high negative composite scores.
The latter group are located in the eastern regions of Poland and the
concentration of negative values in this area can be observed in
Figures 9 to 12. That these regions exhibited consistently high
negative scores would appear to suggest that any governmental policies
78
i i
A
m
cl
111
II
31
a
a ,
I
??? = = ? =-o
7 T * T
5 IS o o% o
o<
f
-oc>--c) o<f
f • " tf ' U T
l'f'"1t*1lf'?1
t T * T * t
7 T f t * T T
1 9 8
5 ! - & • i 1 * S
a 1 I 1 I 1 s I
S I I
79
3,
fi
l
m
141
l!
5 E
I
S 3 S R 8
° » " ?' T
J - Y t 7 • T T
S ! i ; ! ] ! i S.il8i4§
11
hi
80
m
ilt
Ill
3 -|
HI
|4
38
I"
ll
31
o a o «' <n d <jj a" o a -" o" -' o d h d
sssssRpassss «ssss
? 7 - °" r i ° i ° i i i ? - « ° y
7 ° " ** y T T V ? ° "* — o* o" —' d
Y Y " * y T M * T °" ** "* a* "* °* "t*
o>w-Honi-ifN^o<iei/ia 5 n >h S! £!YY°V 0000-' C'""° d O (N d d
ssxassssssss sssss
« m h y Y ? °" 7 ? ? • p « «ji J
Y 00N Y"i,0 'r V "? y??°°
r-ocrio — o r- m c r- ™ ~ n 10 r~ p-H 3
-h O O M .h a o Y If Y* * °' Y "" °" °" 9*
Ini-IS2*S3InK K*' <c o m » eo
- 9 o in _,' ' ^ d o d 0" —' °' = -* =
SSiSKSoS"*''-''-' o r* ci p* w
9 o „ - _, d a _J o o o d -,' f4 «' o
1 i 8 5
I I 1 I I 1 8 5
s £ 3 5 ; s ; i ill I 8 I 1 l3 S S M S 1 2 3
'US
ij
i
all
III
3 ,f
141
ll
i
81
SSl5C?* M,'1 ';t 1»in a <d in r- otn<ve«iuSinmot<T>9n -* id <e to •*
T'l**"T*i'?T m *f <? r- <o o >*> -h
m.SS.KnS8»f*lM&3 P 81 w 3 P
^•MII^CdHHetarf o ^ d .s -."
SS!m(oa!3SPo2'*, R § S "" " *Tf^f^H^f^f V °' • J •
Op-tOrHOOpOppO M i-l N • O
"OO—lrtOO"IOOOO — o o o o
0>>0O>-ii-iNr-mnin>er- o m m ot <-«OOrfOi-l-lF-lOOCIOO *« • M # •
°SSS°SS2S3In3 — -i i" in "*>
o — o-ioooo — o-io a —
i
-j o o
<jimi«cnr<«>mo-H««in oj ri in a> o
_• d -•' -i' -• d O -i' d O d Q M < iH O O
oo-j-"00oo---jcio ? ? '", 7 T1
— a a <i a — oooo-io o p o -i o
-»od-*oop — adpp" onaoo
o>tf>r*imA«4rico(Qdfn\o in t it .-- ::
u-^ *r r- O = ~ —I -o n u^ -f ^1 7' (Tv — "1 ui
— OOIV — OO — OOOO OOO-HO
oo — — — o" o —' o p p d «—.0--0
3 I a sE 1 I ; l i I
| t j | J 1 J
t . I I 8 j i ISo3 « § 2 £ ^
Ill
111
82
— OOOOO — OOOfirjOOO-HOOOC
-IC10Q0C>0.-.00C>0C>QCI«000.-I0C ap — oooooooo^ioe
1=
III
3 u|
I'll
g*
VO>H'-4000000**0000--*'HOOOO~-
r
'?'i'°'°°'?'?''"':'°° n''f?"°V' I
''?' t; 7'" ci«ej — d — BHrtne -qd'ooh--
II
I
a §
I]
.OHOHO^oo-ONO-ODOOOOOOOr. MM odododoo'd — d c
-<ooaoooe>«cioo--ooooor'ioo-*o oddopdooode 000001-
N
-j"Y 000 '7 0000 "* <?"' ei '7 000 " 00 'i''N t? <=°-"P° oooe*° >-i H o o ' n o ci a -i o — -
s'i 3 T°?'i'? '* 00? f"?? '"-0 ? OH 'v oc "TTTT7?°?"T? = -"T-
ills
siliilli.ljisi
83
P?IC |s ?5*S!'!3 NO «wn oi, » H r'««-ii«rTnonnin»»Mn»firiOnoinn. n&__
hiohdh.-chi 1 o> m t h in r
US
r?°V??° '^?^?7? d ? '? '?"°^ d V?? '-\'7Tvf?°T°V7?"7^7 c
"i~iiiiii~iii°°ii™iii~i r*iiiiii <?~i<?°iiiii': iiii°™<?<f
alj
121
¥ T T ° T T * * T *""f ? * ™ T ° °' T T ** *? * ^' "" ° ? • ** rt°
°
'
•* ° °' °' ° ? ** ? " c
i-sfs rt^oepOYY ?^??? ?^?"??^"'?™?^?^??'?"??"^^? ^ ? ^
II
11
D-^OOO-^OOOOOOO-^OOOO—'-^-^O O CH »4 Q O »H <
no'oo'ddoodo'o'odooo'-i-HC
= TY?V~-r?'?T?1
ii -HOrsoaoooooo-'Oi--. ot^cooo-Hoooo — -.ooooo-ioooooo — oo—.O'-j^io;
3~Orf'oo"^0000^'oV.*oooo'o'-H'oO--i--(-iC)0--'OOriO'-00--.--(Op—OOOO — Q-—
o
^POOOOOO-HOOOOfNOOOpO—fOOCpO--HOC:OOmOC1^00-^0000"COO—'OOOO
- o o —' —' ooci^odooooo-H--(--(Oo — ooo —-oooo — oooo — o — c
!. «
5a«#3l«sia| = 2Ti-sii«f MSB* ir!1SiSS£S|S-SSil|BlSlsgg8?
84
FIGURE 9
85
FIGURE 10
86
FIGURE 11
87
FIGURE 12
88
aimed at alleviating discrepancies in regional development levels
failed to accomplish their goals. For the most part, these poorly
developed regions manifested relatively high negative scores in each
variable which combine to produce high negative composite scores. In
the investment variable, however, Rzeszow's score approached the mean
over time and was slightly above the mean (0.09) in 1970. This was
accompanied by an increase in that region's industrial production. But
in spite of these advances, the remainder of the scores combined to
produce a high negative score. This suggests that increased investment
failed to bring about a concomitant raising of overall development.
Consequently, in the case of Rzeszow, the reliance placed upon
industrial development to foster regional development, as discussed
above, seems misplaced.
For the regions exhibiting the highest positive scores between
1955 and 1970 (Katowice, Gdansk and Warsaw) , the scores for individual
variables exhibited considerable differences. Katowice scored highly on
the economic indices and also in sales and radio and television
ownership. These variables are intimately associated with levels
of income derived from the considerable industrial development which
has taken place in that region. Katowice's high score in residential
space gradually diminished during this period. This was apparently
the result of the extension of housing construction to hitherto
weakly developed regions such as Lublin and Bialystok. There was a
considerable increase in the region's prominence in terms of hospital
beds. In absolute numbers, the number of hospital beds in Katowice per
10,000 population rose from 54.2 in 1955 to 69.8 in 1970. This
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represented the highest hospital bed/population ratio in 1970, a level
also attained by Wroclaw. Given the dominance of heavy industry in the
Katowice region - particularly coal-mining and steel-making - one cannot
help but feel that the growth in medical facilities was prompted by
demand for such services. Such a situation would represent what Smith
(1977:133), drawing from Aristotle, terms "proportional equality"; that
is, some less than equal distribution can be justified by special
considerations or criteria. In this case demand for medical care
created by hazardous occupations may represent the special criterion.
Somewhat surprising in the case of Katowice voivodship is the
negative score for kindergarten enrollment. One may have expected a
highly-industrialized region to possess greater pre-school facilities.
A possible explanation may lie in the nature of the industrial
development in Katowice. As noted above, this is primarily in the heavy
industrial sector. This may discourage the employment of many women in
the labor force, thereby reducing the necessity for kindergartens. By
way of contrast, other regions have sought to resolve their lack of
natural resources by undertaking "extensive" industrialization whereby
manpower represents their greatest asset. In these regions the
attraction of women into the labor force may have been accompanied by
greater provision of kindergarten facilities.
In contrast to the Katowice region where the population of
higher education institutions is close to the Polish mean, the Warsaw
region exhibited a very high positive value in this category. This is,
perhaps, expected of a capital city and, in particular, a capital city
in Eastern Europe where academic functions tend to concentrate in such
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cities. Other regions, notably Poznan, Krakow, Wroclaw and Gdansk, also
displayed high positive scores. Krakow's traditional association with
higher education is particularly evident. The existence of regional
centers of higher education can be of considerable importance.
Students at such centers often undertake research connected with the
surrounding region. This research is frequently submitted to local
authorities and, particularly in the case of locational,
settlement and other spatial studies, may favorably influence local
policy.
Besides its high positive score in higher education, Warsaw
maintains high positive scores in each social variable. In economic
terms, however, Warsaw's scores do not significantly surpass the Polish
mean. This may be explained by two important facts. First, the economic
indicators relate to the socialized industrial sector. As the capital,
and largest, city of Poland, Warsaw obviously has a considerable
tertiary sector involved with government, administration (a particularly
large sector in any socialist economy) and services. These are not
included in the economic variables. Second, the city of Warsaw lies in
an extensive, predominantly rural, voivodship. Agrarian employment is
also excluded from the economic variables. These same provisos may
also account for the relatively average composite scores for regions
such as Lodz and Poznan in which there are also located large cities.
The relative advantages demonstrated by the western regions is
further enhanced by the levels of national income in 1960 (Table 10)
.
Particularly evident is the huge contrast between Katowice and the
eastern regions which all exhibit levels of per capita income below the
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Table 10
National Income, 1960
Region Million
zlotys
Million zlotys
per 1000 population
321055.8 10.77
45161.7 12.87
Bydgoszcz . . 21914.6 12.63
32987.9 13.56
35599.0 15.27
18202.8 9.93
18424.2 10.10
Bialystok . . 9808.5 8.90
Olsztyn . . . 8602.4 9.61
17102.9 13.78
Koszalin . . . 6691.6 9.57
Szczecin . . . 10038.1 13.00
Zielona Gora . 9717.1 12.25
Wroclaw . . . 31636.2 13.93
Katowice . . . 58826.2 17.74
33729.1 13.51
Rzeszow
. . . 16610.8 10.35
13079.1 13.81
Source: Dochod Narodc>wv Polski wedlua Woiewc>dztw. 1960-61. KPZK PAN.
GUS Warsaw, 1963
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national average. The considerable differences in the net value added
in industry in 1960 further underline these variations, and go some way
to explaining them (Table 11)
.
The composite scores for each region are mapped in Figures 9
to 12. Mapping such composite scores enables spatial variation to be
assessed with relative ease. Clusters of high or low composite scores
become readily apparent and variation over time may be observed.
The most apparent pattern in these figures is one of an east/
west dichotomy in composite scores. Among the eastern regions
(comprising the voivodships of Olsztyn, Bialystok, Lublin, Kielce and
Rzeszow) there is no evidence of a reduction in the relative
disadvantage occurring in these regions. In fact, there would appear to
have been a consolidation of the west's relative advantage. Moreover,
this east/west division may be traced to the pre-war division of the
nation into Poland 'A' (highly developed) and Poland 'B' (largely
undeveloped)
.
It was previously mentioned that the administrative reform of
1975 precludes the direct comparison of development levels for the
entire post-war period. The mapping of z-scores can assist in overcoming
the barriers imposed by the reform since it enables spatial patterns
to be identified.
The composite scores for 1975 and 1981 are mapped in Figures
13 and 14. It is possible to still identify a broad east/west
distinction. Several eastern regions, for example Bialystok and Lublin,
have now secured positive composite scores, whereas Suwalki, Rzeszow
and Kielce hover about the mean. For these regions the administrative
93
Table 11
Net Value Added in Industry, 1960
Region Million
zlotys
Million zlotys
per 1000 population
201957.4 6.77
21977.8 6.26
Bydgoszcz . . 9110.8 5.25
15241.3 6.26
22669.3 9.72
7861.8 4.28
4413.7 2.42
Bialystok . . 2357.3 2.13
Olsztyn . . • 1888.2 2.10
8613.9 6.94
Koszalin . . . 1479.7 2.11
Szczecin . . . 3787.2 4.90
Zielona Gora . 4161.8 5.24
Wroclaw . . . 17978.3 7.91
6657.3 7.02
Katowice . . . 46031.8 13.88
20694.3 8.29
Bzeszow . . . 7032.7 4.38
Source: Dochod Narodijwy Polski wedlua Woiewodztw
r 1960-61, KPZK PAN,
GUS Warsaw, 1963
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reform, which produced smaller, functional regions, is likely to have
been of considerable advantage in their attaining positive scores.
Relatively large cities such as Lublin and Bialystok were formerly
surrounded by large agricultural regions, but these regions are now
dominated by the large urban centers and their composite scores have
risen accordingly. A similar trend may be observed in the case of Lodz.
Prior to 1975 the voivodship of Lodz incorporated parts of the
contemporary voivodships of Piotrkow, Skierniewice, Plock, Konin and
Sieradz. In 1975 and 1981, three of these voivodships display relatively
high negative composite scores: Sieradz, Skierniewice and Konin.
Piotrkow also had a negative score in 1975. When it incorporated these
voivodships, Lodz maintained a relatively low composite score, reaching
its highest value in 1975 (5.31). Since 1975, however, the voivodship
of Lodz is dominated by the city of Lodz with an urban population of
91.4 per cent in 1981. Concomitant with this has been an increase in
its composite score to 20.30 in 1975 and 12.91 in 1975.
Throughout the period under consideration it becomes apparent
that urbanization is almost synonymous with high development as
measured by these indicators. Prior to 1975, the regions exhibiting
high negative scores - Bialystok, Kielce, Lublin and Rzeszow - also
had high negative scores in the urban population component. This
relationship is still apparent after the administrative reform in
voivodships such as Zamosc, Biala Podlaska and Lomza. Conversely, highly
urbanized voivodships such as Warsaw, Szczecin and Wroclaw register high
positive composite scores.
In some respects this may reflect a certain bias in the
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variables selected for the analysis. With urban population included in
the composite scores this obviously influences results. Other variables,
such as housing space and hospital beds, are also likely to be a
function of urbanization. This highlights the problems associated with
the construction of an index that suitably depicts regional development.
At the same time it emphasizes the dilemma facing the Polish authorities
in accomplishing their avowed aim of the elimination of differences in
living standards between town and countryside.
A comparison of the composite scores for 1975 and 1981 (Tables
8 and 9) reveals a reduction in the scores for most voivodships
during this period. The majority of the scores are approaching the
mean. In the absence of data for additional years it is difficult to
assess whether the general decline in spatial variation results from
deliberate government policy, or whether it is symptomatic of the
crisis experienced in Poland since late 1979.
Retail sales is one component which would appear to have been
particularly affected by the crisis. The general trend would appear to
be as follows: regions which experienced high positive scores in retail
sales in 1975 have, by 1981, had their scores considerably reduced e.g.
Szczecin, Zielona Gora and Koszalin. In comparison, some of the regions
experiencing very low levels of retail sales in 1975 have subsequently
fallen in their scores e.g. Tarnow and Ostroleka. It is possible that
the following explanations may go some way to explaining this trend.
First, the crisis was accompanied by considerable shortfalls in
consumer goods and foodstuffs. This precipitated the introduction of
rationing for scarce goods. By this means, relative equality in
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distribution was achieved and this may explain the general reduction in
retail sales nationwide, the lack of consumer goods particularly
affected the larger urban areas where these goods had previously been
more readily available. Second, in the countryside the onset of the
crisis was accompanied by a return to an 'exchange economy'. With no
consumer goods to purchase, Polish farmers frequently exchanged produce
rather than sell it for money. This would particularly affect the level
of retail sales in rural voivodships.
One is tempted to subscribe to the explanation that the crisis
was the predominant factor in reducing relative regional disparity. The
reduction in investment by 1981, detailed in Table 2 (Chapter 4), was
experienced principally in the largest industrial centers. The outcome
was a dramatic decline in industrial production for the nation as a
whole (Table 12) . Other sectors of the economy experienced similar
declines. The effect of these reductions on the relative indexes
provided by z-scores is to produce a 'tightening' of values around
zero since the large values which formerly influenced the results have
been dramatically reduced.
It is apparent from Table 12 that some sectors of the economy
increased their output in spite of the crisis. Particularly noticeable
are the increases in the communal, housing and health and welfare
sectors. A comparison of the scores for housing space in 1975 and 1981
would appear to suggest that the less developed voivodships, such as
Zamosc, Bialystok and Konin were the beneficiaries of increased housing
construction; in comparison the relative advantages of the large urban-
industrial centers declined significantly, for example Warsaw, Lodz and
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Poland: GNP by Sector of Origin, 1965-1983
(at 1977 adjusted factor cost; 1975=100.0)
Industry 51.3
Agriculture ... 95.5
Forestry 82.7
Construction
. . . 40.5
Transport,
Communications
. . 40.6
Trade 48.3
Communal, other
material
production . . 68.0
Housing 74.1
Financial, other
nonmaterial
services
. . . 90.4
Government .... 74.3
a. education,
culture
. 70.9
b. science . . 33.1
c. health,
welfare . 65.7
d. admin.,
justice . 109.1
e. military
personnel 86.4
TOmL GNP .... 60.
69.4 100.0 101.7 103.5 105.5 104.4 102.9 88.0
58.6 100.0 105.6 105.1 104.7 99.8 94.8 80.0 73.6
92.2
94.8 100.0 101.7 102.2 110.8 104.4 95.1 99.2 103.7 107.6
82.1 100.0 98.9 100.6 97.3 100.3 107.3 108.1 119.5 122.5
76.3
55.1 100.0 107.1 113.1 119.1 118.6 121.0 105.2 98.5 103.4
63.6 100.0 104.1 107.5 107.7 108.1 107.1 100.5 92.0 97.0
78.5 100.0 102.6 105.2 108.7 112.7 117.3 122.2 123.8 123.1
87.3 100.0 102.9 106.0 108.7 111.4 114.4 116.9 119.1 121.3
94.7 100.0 96.0 97.8 99.5 101.4 103.5 105.4 106.6 106.6
84.0 100.0 101.4 103.6 104.7 106.8 108.0 110.1 111.1 114.1
85.5 100.0 101.3
48.3 100.0 100.0
101.6 102.7 104.5 106.0 110.8 115.7 120.7
99.3 100.0 99.4 98.6 95.6 78.3 70.6
108.3 110.8 114.3 117.2 122.3 125.6 130.2
100.1 100.6 102.2 101.4 100.8 99.7 99.7
77.9 100.0 103.6
76.9 100.0 99.2 108.3 107.6 110.6 110.6 105.0 107.8 113.9
73.0 100.0 102.5 104.4 108.1 106.2 103.6 98.1 97.5 101.2
Source: Economic Growth in Eastern Europe, 1965, 1970 and 1975-1983
Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe, flccasinnal Paper No. 30. 1984
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Krakow. Again, unaccessible data for more recent years precludes the
possibility of drawing a conclusion as to whether the apparent
development of smaller, regional centers constitutes the outcome of
premeditated government policy, or whether their relative progress is
due to temporary lessening of the advantages enjoyed by the highly
developed regions. Given that the Perspective Plan for Spatial
Development to 1990 calls for the rapid development of regional centers
one may conclude that it is indeed the result of conscious policy.
INDICATIONS OF OONVERGENCE
By means of the z-scores the relative levels of regional
development were assessed. While some considerable disparities were
indicated, it would appear that, in relative terms, the levels of
disparity are diminishing somewhat. In order to ascertain whether this
is in fact the case the data were analyzed by employing Lorenz curves
and Gini coefficients.
Lorenz curves are a widely used measurement in the study of
inequality. Regions are ranked according to their ratios of advantage,
and the cumulative percentages of the attribute to be measured are
plotted against the cumulative percentage of regions. Perfect equality
would produce a 45 degree diagonal line; the greater the inequality
the greater the departure from this line.
The difference between the plotted curve and the line of perfect
equality may be defined as the "area of inequality". By relating the
"area of inequality" to the total area below the diagonal line one may
derive a Gini coefficient - sometimes known as the "index of
dissimilarity". For this coefficient, values range from to 1; a
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value of would represent perfect equality, whilst 1 would indicate
total concentration of the attribute in one place.
In the computation of the Gini coefficients for this analysis
the data employed were standardized into per capita statistics. This
departs from the absolute values normally employed in such measurements.
As I previously mentioned, this analysis seeks to uncover relative
advantage or disadvantage, not absolute . Thus per capita data are more
appropriate.
A glance at the Gini coefficients (Table 13) reveals that in the
variables selected for this analysis there has been a consistent
reduction in the inequality of their distribution. This is graphically
illustrated by the Lorenz curves (Figures 15 to 25) where the plotted
curve displays a gradual convergence upon the line of perfect equality.
This trend was interrupted in 1975 following the administrative reform,
but has since continued.
A closer examination of the Gini coefficients reveals several
important facts. Whilst the trend has been one of diminishing
inequalities, several coefficients suggest that considerable disparity
still exists. In employing per capita data one creates coefficients
in which the values are likely to be smaller. Thus even a small value
(i.e. close to zero) can conceal considerable regional diversity in
absolute values of an attribute. One should refrain, therefore, from
concluding that regional disparity in Poland has been practically
eliminated. The economic indicators, in addition to urban population,
higher education, doctors and hospital beds, suggest that relatively
high levels of regional inequality among these variables still exist.
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Table 13
Gini Coefficients, 1955-1981
Variable 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1981
Urban Population
. . . 0.202 0.179 0.173 0.156 0.214 0.188
Employment 0.165 0.138 0.124 0.109 0.137 0.110
Investment 0.175 0.169 0.128 0.127 0.230 0.131
Industrial Production 0.314 0.255 0.235 0.218 0.222 0.198
Residential Space
. . 0.150 0.140 0.115 0.076 0.121 0.091
Retail Sales 0.128 0.113 0.099 0.083 0.099 0.085
Kindergarten Enrollment 0.117 0.114 0.081 0.065 0.097 0.062
Students in Higher
Education 0.512 0.492 0.446 0.375 0.717 0.643
Radio and Television
Ownership 0.131 0.126 0.125 0.107 0.097 0.084
Doctors 0.215 0.195 0.171 0.161 0.251 0.200
Hospital Beds .... 0.161 0.147 0.127 0.110 0.230 0.131
LCRENZ CURVE , 'JHBAN population
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Consequently, the Polish authorities must continue to address the
disparity in these indicators.
Nevertheless, the general trend of the Gini coefficients is
suggestive of convergence in levels of regional development.
Particularly noticeable is the reduction in disparity among residential
space, retail sales, kindergarten enrollment and radio and television
ownership. Although one must bear in mind that these are by no means
a comprehensive indication of relative social development, the continued
reduction in their values is highly suggestive that central management
of the economy has provided a major vehicle for the spatial
redistibution of wealth. And, as Hamilton (1982:126) suggests
such a conclusion would lend some support to those in Poland
who argue that the location of productive activities per se is not
absolutely essential, while still being very important, in the
regional development and interregional equalization processes.
SUMMARY
In attempting to delineate postwar regional development trends
in Poland, one is hindered by statistical discontinuities and
inadequacies. The administrative reform of 1975 also confounds spatial-
temporal studies. Despite these impediments the analysis undertaken
above has illustrated a number of important facts in relation to
regional development trends in Poland in the post-war period. In
addition, it has highlighted some of the crucial problems which may
arise in the assessment of regional equality.
The selection of adequate indicators for measuring regional
development is a highly problematical process. Statistical inadequacies
aside, the researcher is faced with an extremely subjective task in
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order to select objective variables. This dilemma is compounded by the
need to adequately define equity. In this analysis the notion of
arithmetic equality was considered as a basis from which to assess
regional inequity.
The results of the analysis pointed toward a gradual process of
regional equalization taking place in Poland between 1955 and 1981. This
was interrupted in 1975, as a result of the administrative reform, but
it has since continued. That gradual elimination of regional inequality
is occuring concurs with an analysis undertaken by Koropeckyj (1977:126)
who concludes that there has been "truly impressive gains towards
inter-regional equalization [in Poland]." Such an optimistic claim
mirrors conclusions reached by Polish authors such as Misztal and
Kaczorowski (1980) and Zawadzki (1974) . It is necessary, however, to
point out that Fallenbuchl (1975) and Zimon (1978) cite conflicting
conclusions which suggest that convergence is not taking place.
In view of the lack of consensus on methodological questions
one may suggest that the variety of methods employed may account for
the differences in results. Fallenbuchl (1975) employs a ranking
procedure in order to obtain crude development measures. Zimon (1978),
in contrast, attempts to design a sophisticated framework of analysis
by combining a number of indexes. Williamson's (1965) coefficient of
variation was the starting point for Koropeckyj (1977) . This variety of
methodology and the variables employed may contribute to the lack of
concurring results.
For the analysis undertaken in this paper a relatively simple
approach was taken. Since the main concern was for the identification
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of regional development levels among regions, the employment of z-scores
was felt to be an adequate - albeit simple - method. And in seeking to
identify trends in development the Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient
are admirable methods.
By means of the z-scores it was possible to produce a Standard
Score Additive Model which indicated relative levels of regional
development in terms of eleven indices. The mapping of these scores
enabled spatial patterns to be observed. From these maps the eastern
regions were identified as lagging in terms of development. More
recently it would appear that the level of disparity between these
regions and the remainder of the nation has been diminished.
Unfortunately, more recent data is unavailable and so it is not
possible to assess whether this trend has continued.
The extension of urban development would appear to be
particularly important in the process of regional equalization. Whilst
it is accepted that the indices employed may have been biased toward
urban centers, it is nevertheless relatively apparent that regional
development prospers from urban development. This would appear to
conform with the ideas of Poland's spatial planners who, through the
Perspective Plan for Spatial Development to 1990, have advocated the
extension of urban development through the creation of urban
agglommerations and other large urban centers.
In relation to the regional convergence observed in this
analysis mention was made of the crisis that has recently befallen
Poland. It is possible that this has affected regional development
trends in a number of ways. Until the early 1970s Poland was able to
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exploit the considerable surpluses of labor in the eastern regions in
particular. This method of "extensive" development resulted in a buoyant
economy that grew very rapidly. More recently, however, the Poles have
had to turn to "intensive" development methods. Although considerable
Western credit was provided in the past fifteen years, much of the
capital was squandered on the purchase of equipment which could not be
used and in constructing luxurious offices for the Party and security
police (Macshane, 1981:39). As a result, the rate of national economic
growth has precipitously declined. In the absence of continued credit -
and a massive foreign debt - the Poles are experiencing great
difficulties in modernizing their economy in order to re-establish high
growth rates. The relative decline of the large urban-industrial centers
that was outlined above may be considered indicative of these problems.
At the same time the weakly-developed regions have displayed some
growth. I would suggest that this may be due to the continued
extensive' development of these regions as the authorities seek to
exploit the last vestiges of surplus labor.
It remains to be seen whether the apparent trend toward
regional equalization continues. The Polish authorities must now
tackle the considerable problems facing the nation. In their efforts to
repay their massive foreign debt - along with western pressure for them
to do so - the Poles may find it impossible to undertake the
modernization of the economy that is so fundamental for future growth.
This may enable continued convergence in regional development levels,
but it may well be that equal, regional shares will be of a very small
pie.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
It seems inevitable that questions of regional development and,
more specifically, regional equity will become increasingly fundamental
issues in both developing and developed nations. All too often the
pursuit of efficiency in economic development can eclipse the notion of
an equitable distribution of a nation's wealth. Those living in the
areas left behind do not always accept their plight. Sporadic outbreaks
of violence - in inner cities or in impoverished regions - are patent
reminders of the duty of governments to address the question of spatial
inequity.
In socialist nations the need to redress inequitable living
standards and levels of economic development among regions is accorded
additional urgency by the ideological imperative. Prosecution of
Marxist-Leninist ideology binds these nations to seeking to eliminate
interregional disparities in socio-economic development.
This paper has examined the theory and practice of regional
development in one such socialist nation, Poland. In its pursuit of
regional equity the Polish authorities, in common with many other
socialist nations, have placed considerable faith in the system of
regional planning. An examination of inter-war regional planning in
Poland revealed important continuities with the post-war period. Many
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of the nethodological advances made in the 1930s were subsequently
adopted by Polish, and other, regional planners.
In discussing the regional planning system in Poland it was
observed that questions of national economic development have frequently
impaired attempts to achieve regional equality. This precedence is
reflected in the structure of the planning hierarchy in which regional
planning is subordinated to national economic planning. Considerable
attention has been paid to ways in which this relationship may be
improved to obtain mutually beneficial results but, as yet, no
significant reforms have been undertaken.
Although a commitment to the achievement of regional equality
has persisted, it was shown that the policies adopted in the past forty
years have been far from consistent. In the 1950s, under the influence
of Stalinism, policies were aimed at a uniform distribution of
productive forces throughout the nation. This approach was subsequently
rejected in favor of policies of rational distribution. More recently
the elaboration of the Perspective Plan for Spatial Development to
1990 has called for the creation of functional regions, each with an
economic specialization, and based upon urban centers in a pattern of
moderate, polycentric concentration. In spatial terms, the Perspective
Plan represents the principle policy. But it remains to be seen how the
Polish government will reconcile the aim of controlled regional growth
with the need to maximize production in the very short term in order to
maintain payments of its enormous foreign debts. At the same time, the
spectre of Solidarnosc and the social policy embodied in the independent
trade union's demands, will require considerable attention to be placed
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upon the adequate provision of social and economic facilities in each
region.
The analysis of regional development levels among voivodships
between 1955 and 1981 revealed that there is an apparent trend toward
convergence in socio-economic terms. Several considerable disparities
were shown to remain, however. It was speculated that whilst government
policy was important in achieving this convergence, the nature of
development in Poland may have been the prime cause. Extensive
development has succeeded in putting into motion quantitative factors
of the Polish economy, such as manpower and resources. This mode of
development has continued in hitherto weakly developed voivodships. In
the urban-industrial centers, however, considerable problems have
emerged as the Poles attempt to modernize the economy.
Through the analysis it emerged that while urban development is
intimately linked to overall levels of development, considerable success
has been achieved in the re-distribution of wealth to voivodships
lacking the resources for industrial development. This may illustrate
an advantage of a centrally-managed economy in securing equable living
standards of living and well-being.
In sum, I believe that this paper has raised some important
questions relating to spatial equity. Whilst providing some answers,
many more remain, such as the most appropriate method for measuring
regional inequality. However, through the exposure of theory and
practice of regional development in Poland, it is hoped that this paper
has contributed to the understanding of regional development in general
and the nature of regional development in a socialist nation in
121
particular
.
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ABSTRACT
The question of spatial equality, the equable distribution of a
nation's wealth, is one that has recently commanded much attention.
Serious imbalances in levels of socio-economic development have been
identified in both developing and developed nations. For some authors
the occurence of spatial inequality derives from flaws inherent in the
capitalist system. Many of these same authors propose that mature
socialist nations may possess a greater capacity for establishing more
equable levels of living standards and well-being. It is the object of
this paper to examine post-war regional development in one such
socialist nation, Poland.
Regional planning is viewed by the Polish authorities as a means
by which inequitable levels of socio-economic development may be
redressed. The evolution of regional planning in the inter-war period
is examined as it is apparent that continuities exist between this
period and subsequent, post-war, practice.
Despite a continued commitment to the diminution, and eventual
elimination, of regional disparities, the policies adopted by the Polish
government have not been consistent. These variations in policy are
assessed, together with the institutions of regional development which
are instrumental in the elaboration and implementation of such policy.
In order to assess whether the Polish authorities have been
successful in the pursuit of their declared aims, an analysis of
regional levels of socio-economic development is undertaken. It is shown
1
that while considerable disparities exist, there has been a consistent
lessening of disproportions in the indicators employed. Results
suggest that the centrally-managed economy has provided an important
vehicle for the redistribution of wealth within the nation. The
'extensive 1 node of development was also felt to be a significant
factor in reducing spatial inequality in socio-economic development.
